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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between labour market rigidities and
unemployment. The thesis does not attempt to undertake surveys, providing instead an
overview of the literature and of South African works.
The unemployment - labour market rigidity debate is analysed with particular reference to the
experiences of European countries belonging the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). It appears that while adverse shocks acted in the direction of raising
unemployment, they could not account for the considerable heterogeneity or the persistence in
unemployment levels across countries. The possibility that labour market institutions or
rigidities had a role to play in propagating the effects of adverse shocks on unemployment
was then raised, leading to the emergence of a broad consensus that European unemployment
has its sources in the interactions of adverse shocks and adverse labour market institutions.
Rigidities in the labour market have their source in trade uruon intransigence and in the
legislation governing the labour market. Trade unions in South Africa are strong and in the
past have been particularly militant in achieving their objectives of raising members ' wages
and improving conditions of employment. The regulatory environment in which the South
African labour market operates was examined . South Africa 's adoption of labour legislation
that is very trade union friendly, and that introduces greater inflexibility into the market and
affects business's abilities to adapt to change, which is particularly necessary within the
context of globalisation, is against the trend observed internationally. The implementation of
such legislation seems irresponsible in a country where conservatively 26,4 percent of the
economically active population is unemployed.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The year 1994 saw the birth of democracy in South Africa. The new democratic government
expressed a strong commitment to reducing poverty and unemployment, decreasing the
disparities in the distribution of income and wealth , restructuring the economy and improving
the economic growth rate . Legislation was reformed removing the racial biases that had
formed the cornerstone of the apartheid policies. However the legacies of the apartheid era
continue to affect the operation of the South African economy. The cycle of low investment
leading to poor economic growth, which in turn results in higher levels of unemployment and
the manifestation of various socio-economic ills, seems to be self-perpetuating. Jobless
growth has come to characterise the economy . Unemployment standing at 26,4 percent and
36,2 percent in terms of the official and expanded definitions of unemployment respectively is
high by any standard. Reducing unemployment and thereby improving the living standard of
the South African people is a major challenge facing the country.
The importance of achieving macroeconomic stability, a necessary requirement for sustainable
economic growth, has underpinned South African government policy. The government chose
to adopt a gradualist approach to economic reform and followed largely the ideal policy
sequence of reform that has come to be known as the Washington Consensus. The exception
has been in the reform of the legislation governing the labour market. In this area the
government has gone against the international trend and elected to adopt legislation that
strongly favours the employed and that is particularly trade union friendly. Additional
rigidities have been introduced into a labour market already plagued by an inability to create
jobs. It is argued that rigidities or institutional arrangements prevent the free operation of the
market mechanism in the labour market and are responsible for unemployment. This thesis
seeks to determine the validity of the link between labour market rigidities and unemployment.
The experience of European countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is considered and where possible lessons for South
Africa are drawn. The thesis does not present the results of survey research, providing instead
an overview of the relevant literature and South African works.
Chapter two reviews the extent and the nature of the unemployment problem that South Africa
faces . It describes the change that has occurred in the output structure of the economy and
identifies the areas in which employment is expanding .
Chapter three then examines with specific reference to the experience of European OECD
countries, the possible causes of unemployment. Empirical evidence on the link between
labour market rigidities and unemployment is examined. The chapter concludes with a brief
comment on the policy responses to unemployment.
Chapter four presents a theoretical overview of the impacts of trade unions on the labour
market. Trade unions as a source of labour market rigidity is of particular relevance to South
Africa where organised labour has a significant voice in the political process and trade union
density is very high by international standards.
Chapter five takes an in-depth look at the trade union organisations prevalent in the South
African labour market. The impacts of trade unions on the labour market is analysed in terms
of the labour market segmentation and the labour aristocracy theories.
Chapter six considers South Africa 's progress in the liberalisation of trade in the context of
globalisation. The effects of trade liberalisation and globalisation on the labour market and
unemployment in particular, are examined .
Chapter seven analyses the effects of the recent labour legislation on employment. The
legislation namely the Labour Relations Act, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act , the
Employment Equity Act and the Skills Development Act, has created a new labour relations
environment. The challenge is for business to operate as efficiently as possible within this new
environment given the increasing pressures to become internationally competitive and then to
maintain such a position. The labour relations system should promote a stable and productive
work environment conducive to economic growth, investment and employment creation. Any
aspects of the legislation that hinder the achievement of the aforementioned are identified.
Chapter eight concludes and presents any recommendations and / or lessons to be learnt from
the European experience.
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2 UNEMPLOYMENT: THE SOUTH AFRICAN
SITUATION
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyses the extent and the nature of unemployment in South Africa.
Unemployment is one of the most serious and challenging socio-economic problems facing
South Africa. Employment (including self-employment and employment in the formal sector)
forms the primary link between economic growth and better living standards. Th~ rising level
of unemployment has thus become the greatest single cause of severe poverty with
unemployment having replaced race as the major factor behind inequality. The fact that the
Gini coefficient, which measures the extent to which the actual distribution of earnings in a
country deviates from the perfectly equal distribution (that is, the degree of income inequality),
would fall from 0,60 to 0,41 for the period 1985 - 1991 if the unemployed and informal sector
participants were excluded from the data, is an indication of the extent to which job creation
could reduce inequality (Barker, 1999b : 164).
Unemployment also contributes to, or is the source of a number of other socio-economic ills
(Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 1). It not only impacts negatively on the individual' s dignity
and self-respect, but its effects permeate the whole of society. The frustration and desperation
caused by being unemployed often lead to lawlessness and violence.
Although employment creation is a policy priority not much success has been achieved in this
direction. The high levels of unemployment are affecting perceptions among the populace of
the success or failure of a market economy in South African context. Disadvantaged
communities increasingly hold the view that the market economy at best cannot solve the
problem, or at worst is cause of unemployment (Barker, 1999b : 164). Unless there is a
significant increase in job creation there is the danger that South Africa will become an
'enclave economy', in which the formal, unionised and relatively well-paid sectors of the
economy produce more while employing a smaller and smaller percentage of the labour force.
The increasing numbers of unemployed and those in marginal employment are likely to have a
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destabilising effect, further damaging an already low level of confidence ill the country
(Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 6).
2.2 MEASURING UNEMPLOYMENT
Controversy surrounds the real level of unemployment in South Africa. Available data
concerning unemployment is unsatisfactory. Although this is to be expected in a developing
country, the situation is exacerbated by additional shortcomings in the data. Firstly, no
unemployment series for all population groups combined for any significant length of time
exist; secondly, individual series are not always comparable over time due either to changes in
statistical techniques ancIJor the exclusion in various years of certain geographical areas; and
thirdly, definitions and survey methods have differed over time (Barker, 1999b : 168).
Prior to 2000 the official estimates of unemployment were based on the October Household
Surveys (OHS) conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), previously known as the
Central Statistical Service. However in early 2000 Statistics South Africa introduced the
Labour Force Survey (LFS), which, like the OHS, is a household-based survey. The LFS
assembles information twice yearly on the employed and the unemployed in the formal and
informal sectors in greater detail than could be achieved using the OHS.
Statistics South Africa recently revised its definition of the official unemployment rate, bringing
South Africa's definition in line with the main International Labour Organisation (ILO)
definition. This definition is used by more than 80 percent of both developed and less
developed countries among 114 countries, including South Africa's major trading partners
(Stats SA, 1998 : I). According to the official or strict unemployment rate, the unemployed
are defined as those people who
a) did not work during the seven days prior to the interview;
b) wish to work and are available to begin working within a week ofthe interview; and
c) have taken active steps to look for work or to start some form of self-employment in the
four weeks prior to the interview
(Stats SA, 1998 : 11).
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This definition replaced as the official definition the so-called expanded unemployment rate
which includes all persons who are not working but are willing to work, regardless of whether
they actively sought employment during the month of reference.
The official or strict definition of unemployment, although in line with the International Labour
Organisation's recommendations, is criticised in that the criterion of"have taken active steps to
seek work" may be unrealistic and financially burdensome on the unemployed in a developing
country. Discouraged job-seekers in the special retrospective survey of employment and
unemployment, which was conducted by Statistics South Africa during September 1997 among
a sample of 12 000 respondents drawn one per household, cited the following as the main
reasons for having ceased searching for employment (Stats SA, 1998 : 12):
• a loss ofhope offinding ajob (33%);
• a shortage ofjobs in the area in which they live (25%); and
• a lack of funds for transport to look for work (18%).
The low probability of finding a job, high transport costs and low incomes all contribute to a
large pool ofdiscouraged work seekers.
The official or strict definition of unemployment may thus understate South Africa's true
unemployment position. Statistics South Africa therefore publishes both the expanded and the
new official definition of the unemployment rate, for comparability with previous OHS reports ,
and also because, as stated by the International Labour Organisation (lLO), the expanded
definition may be appropriate "in situations where the conventional means of seeking work
are of limited relevance, where the labour market is unorganised or of limited scope, where
labour absorption is at the time inadequate". These circumstances are applicable to a degree in
South Africa (Stats SA, 1998 : 12).
In comparison with other countries South Africa has one of the highest levels of unemployment
in the world. In 1994 according to comparative estimates by the International Labour
Organisation (lLO), only Reunion (34%) and Macedonia (32%) had rates of unemployment as
high or higher than South Africa. Spain and Algeria notorious for their high unemployment
rates were well below the South African level with rates just above 20% (Schlemmer and
Levitz, 1998 : 2). However caution needs to be sounded about these international
comparisons. The ILO Yearbooks of Labour Statistics are incomplete since the numbers of
unemployed are often not given as a proportion of the labour force. Furthermore the ILO data
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are derived from the official statistics submitted by countries and their validity is thus
questionable, since some countries are known to rework their figures to project the desired
national image (Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 16).
Many third world countries have low levels of recorded unemployment because labour is
absorbed by rural peasant or subsistence sectors and by the informal trading and craft sectors.
The ILO attempted to calculate unemployment rates in the 'modem' sectors of the economies
of a number of third world countries. These recalculated unemployment rates were much
higher than the rates set out in the ILO' s annual statistics (Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 16).
However underemployment also occurs in South Africa, so the contrasts between South Africa
and the rest of the world are not fully explained.
The Labour Market Commission in a report released in June 1996 referred to a technical
review undertaken by the ILO labour market policies branch which concluded that the
unemployment problem was significantly overestimated (Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 17).
The ILO review team expressed concern over the use of the Central Statistical Service (now
Statistics South Africa) household surveys in estimating unemployment since the surveys
contained certain biases stemming from respondent mistrust. The team also found
inconsistencies between the household survey results and other official estimates of sectoral
employment derived from commercial and industrial surveys conducted by the Central
Statistical Service and the South African Reserve Bank (Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 17).
However, the official sectoral estimates by the Central Statistical Service and the South African
Reserve Bank are based on returns submitted to the relevant official agencies and normally no
information is supplied on the level of response to questionnaires sent out or on the
completeness of the agencies' enumeration frameworks. Hence Schlemmer and Levitz (1998 :
17) argue that biases exist on both sides of the comparisons, which the ILO team was making.
Statistics South Africa has carried out seven October Household SurveysI (OHSs) : in 1993,
1994, 1995, 1996,1997, 1998 and 1999. However the 1993 OHS is not comparable with the
later surveys since it did not cover the former Transkei, Bophutathswana, Venda and Ciskei
I A household is defined by Statistics South Africa (1998 : 14) as consisting ofa single person or a group of
people who live together for at least four nights a week, who eat together and who share resources.
6
(TBVC states). The 1994 OHS covered the whole country and respondents in 30 000
households in a thousand enumeration areas (EAs) were interviewed with thirty households
visited in each EA. In 1995, 30 000 households were covered, with 3 000 EAs being sampled
and 10 households visited in each EA, that is, the sample was more widely dispersed
throughout the country. In 1996, time and financial constraints meant that the survey took
place in November with 16 000 households visited in 1 600 EAs. In 1997, 30 000 households
were covered and visited as in 1995. In 1998, 20 000 households were selected from 2 000
EAs and 10 households visited per EA and in 1999, 30 000 households were covered and 10
households visited per EA (Statistical Release P0317, 2000).
In February 2000 Statistics South Africa conducted the first round of the Labour Force
Survey, a twice-yearly rotating panel household survey, designed with the intention of
measuring the dynamics of employment and unemployment in the country. This initial round
was based on a probability sample of 10 000 dwelling units. The sample size was then
increased to 30 000 dwelling units for the next two rounds conducted in September 2000 and
February 2001 respectively.
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 compare overall labour market trends over the period 1996 - 2001
based on the official and the expanded definitions of unemployment respectively. In 1996 and
1997 the sampling frame did not adequately cover mining hostels and thus those working in the
mining sector were excluded from the calculations of labour force statistics. However in 1998
and 1999, the sampling frame was able to adequately include these mining hostels and Statistics
South Africa has therefore included, where possible, those working in the mining sector in
1996 and 1997 to make the statistics comparable. The statistics on mining employment during
these two years were obtained from the formal establishment based Survey of Total
Employment and Earnings (STEE) (Statistical Release P0317, 2000).
Row a and row A of Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 respectively compare the number of employed in
the formal sector according to the STEEs2 of September 1996 to September 1999 with the
2 The STEE collects data on formal employment in South Africa. However the following areas are excluded:
a) agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing; b) restaurants and other eating and drinking places, boarding
houses, caravan parks, guest farms; c) water and air transport; financial institutions other than banks and
insurance companies ; d) real estate and business services; e) private educational services; f) medical,
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number employed in other types of employment, across the four October Household Surveys.
Only the total number of employed is given for 2000 and 2001 since the Labour Force Surveys
do not give a comparable breakdown.
Table 2.1 Employment, Labour Force Participation And Absorption And
Unemployment In The South African Economy Based On The Official Definition Of
Unemployment, 1996 - 2001
The labour statist ics mclude the mmmg sector .
Labour market variables 1996
1 19971 1998 1 1999 1 2000
2 2001 2
N in N in N in N in N in N in
'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs
A Total employed 9287 9247 9390 10 369 11 712 II 837
Among the employed:
Employed in the formal sector STEE 5242 5 139 4945 4 840
survey (excluding agriculture and
certa in activities not covered in STEE)
Employed in agriculture* 759 717 935 I 099
Employed in formal sector activities 1 550 I 587 1 445 1 724
not covered in STEE **
Employed in the informa l sector*** 996 I 136 1 3 16 I 907
Employed in domestic service 740 668 749 799
B Total unemployed (official definition) 2224 2 451 3 163 3 158 4082 4 240
C Total economically act ive - a +b I I 511 I I 698 12553 13 527 15794 16077
0 Total not economically active 13 146 13 4 14 13 157 12753 11 100 11 044
E Total aged 15 - 65 years = c + d 24 657 25 112 25 710 26280 26 894 27 121
F Labour absorpti on rate = a*100/e 37,7% 36,8% 36,5% 39,5% 43,5% 43,6%
G Labour force part icipat ion rate - 46,7% 46,7% 48,8% 51,5% 58,7% 59,3%
c*IOO/e
H Official unemploym ent rate - b*100/c 19,3% 2 1,0% 25,2% 23,3% 25,8% 26,4%
. .
Source: Statist ics South Africa: 1 - Statistical Release P0317 (October Household Surveys)
2 - Statistical Release P02 10 (Labour Force Surveys, Septem ber 2000 and February 200 1
denta l and other health services ; g) welfare and religious organisations; h) recreational and cultural services
(Stats S.A. : Statistical Release P03 l7, 2000 ).
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Table 2.2 Employment, Labour Force Participation And Absorp tion And
Unemployment In The South African Economy Based On The Expanded Definition Of
Unemployment, 1996 - 2001
*The 1996 sample size was smaller than for the other three years. Statistics by industry shou ld therefore be
Labour market variables 19961 1997
1 19981 19991 2000
2 20012
N in N in N in N in N in N in
'OOOs 'OOOs 'OOOs ' OOOs 'OOOs ' OOOs
A Total employed 9287 9 247 9 390 10369 I I 712 II 837
Among the employed:
Employed in the formal sector STEE 5 242 5 139 4945 4840
survey (excluding agriculture and
certa in activities not covered in STEE)
Employed in agriculture* 759 717 935 1099
Employed in formal sector activities I 550 I 587 1 445 I 724
not covered in STEE**
Employed in the informal sector*** 996 I 136 I 316 I 907
Employed in domestic service 740 668 749 799
B Total unemployed (expanded 4566 5 202 5634 5 882 6559 6 96 1
definition)
C Total economically active = A + B 13853 14449 15024 1625 1 18 272 18 798
D Total not economically active 10804 10663 10 686 10 028 8 623 8 323
E Tota l aged 15 - 65 years = C + D 24 657 25 112 25710 26280 26 894 27 121
F Labour absorption rate = A*100l E 37,7% 36,8% 36,5% 39,5% 43,5% 43,6%
G Labour force participation rate = 56,2% 57,5% 58,4% 61,8% 67,9% 69,3%
C* IOO/E
H Expanded unemployment rate = B 33,0% 36,0% 37,5% 36,2% 35,9% 37,0%
* IOOIC
..
interpreted with caut ion. Differences in sampling methodology may account for unstable employment measures
in the agricu ltura l sector.
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** The formal industri es not covered by STEE are given footnote 2
*** The 1996 survey did not distingui sh between the formal and informal sectors with regard to employees.
This distinction was made in 1997, 1998 and 1999 and thus the size of the informal sector in 1996 was
estimated using the proportions of informa l employers and employees in the aforementioned years.
Statisti cs include the minin g sector.
Source: Statistics South Africa : I - Statistical Release P0317 (October Household Surveys)
2 - Stati stical Release P0210 (Labour Force Surveys, September 2000 and February 200 I)
Referring to Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 it is evident that:
• The total number of employed has increased from 9,3 million in 1996 to 11 ,8 million as of
February 2001. The labour absorption rate - the percentage of working age population
which was employed - fell from 37,7% in 1996 to 36,8% in 1997 and 36,5% in 1998,
increasing thereafter to 39,5%, 43,5% and 43,6% in 1999, September 2000 and February
2001 respectively.
• The number ofjobs in the formal non-agricultural sectors of the economy declined from 6,8
million in September 1996 to approximately 6,7 million in September 1999, September
2000 and February 2001. The percentage of the labour force that has access to formal
employment (including agriculture but excluding domestic service) has fallen steadily from
65,6% in 1996 to 45,9% in February 2001 as shown in Figure 2.1 This inability of the
formal sector to generate sufficient employment is a major structural problem in the South
African economy (SARB Quarterly Bulletin, September 2000).
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Figure 2.1 Percentage OfThe Labour Force With Access To Formal
Employment Including Agriculture But Excluding Domestic Service









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
percentage with access to formal employment
Source: Statistics South Africa :Statistical Releases P0317 and P0210
• The informal sector appears to have become an important job creator. The informal sector
(excluding domestic service) has grown from 1 million in 1996 to 2,7 million in 2001. The
February 2001 LFS alone indicates an increase of approximately 0,8 million jobs in the
informal sector from the 1,9 million in September 2000. This is a significant increase and
more data over a longer time frame will be required to determine whether the accuracy of
the estimate has been affected by nonsampling error.
• Statistics South Africa (1998 : 12) defines the economically active population as those
between the ages of 15 and 65 who are either employed or unemployed. This does not
include full-time students, full-time homemakers, pensioners and disabled people. The size
of the economically active population (labour force) will thus vary according to the
definition of unemployment used. The total number of economically active people based
on the official definition of unemployment increased from 11,5 million in 1996 to 16,077
million in 2001. Under the expanded definition the total number of economically active
people increased from 13,9 million in 1996 to 18,8 million in 2001.
• The labour force participation rate - the percentage of the population aged 15 to 65 years
which was economically active - remained constant at 46,7% in 1996 and 1997, increasing
II
thereafter to 48,8%, 51,5%, 58,7% and 59,3% in 1998, 1999,2000 and 2001 respectively.
(The corresponding figures under the expanded definition are shown in row G of Table
2.2.)
• The number of unemployed has increased from 2,2 million in 1996 to 4,2 million in 2001.
The official unemployment rate increased from 19,3% in 1996 to 26,4% in 2001 as shown
in Figure 2.2. Although the number of unemployed remained constant between 1998 and
1999, the number of economically active people increased and hence the proportion of
unemployed was slightly smaller in 1999. The expanded unemployment rate increased
from 33% in 1996 to 37% in 2001.
Figure 2.2 Official And Expanded Unemployment Rates In South
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I-+-Official unemployment rate - Expanded unemployment rate I
Source: Statistics South Africa: Statistical Releases P0317 and P0210
Figure 2.3 breaks those in employment down by industry. Wholesale, retail trade and catering
and accommodation services employ the largest number of workers, followed by community,
social and personal services, and manufacturing. The growing importance of the services
sector as an employer is consistent with the trend observed in industrialised countries.
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2.2.1 BREAKDOWN OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY URBAN AND
NON-URBAN AREAS, GENDER, POPULATION GROUP AND LEVEL
OF EDUCATION
It is important to consider the level of unemployment in terms of population group, gender,
education and location. Table 2.3 shows the official unemployment rates over the period 1998
- 1999 by area of residence, population group and gender while Figure 2.4 shows the official
unemployment rates by population group and gender for February 2001.
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Table 2.3 Official Unemployment Rates Amongst Males And Females Living In Urban
And Non-Urban Areas By Population Group (Excluding The Mining Sector), October
1998 And 1999
* number of responses too few for analysis
Each percentage is a percen tage of all the people in that parti cular category
Source: Statistics South Africa: Statistical Release P0317, 1999
Population Group Urban Urban Non- Non- Total Total Total
Male Female Urban Urban Male Female %
% % Male Female % %
% %
All population groups:
1998 19,4 27, 1 26,1 36,9 21,5 30,1 25,2
1999 18,4 25,8 22,7 32,3 19,8 27,8 23,3
Africans:
1998 26,6 37,3 28,4 39,8 27,3 38,3 32,0
1999 24, 1 35,0 25,2 34,9 24,5 35,0 29,2
Coloureds:
1998 15,5 20,8 -** -** 13,3 18,9 15,8
1999 15,7 19,1 -** -** 13,4 17,5 15,2
Indians:
1998 13,6 17,2 -** -** 13,6 16,9 14,7
1999 14,6 16,4 -** -** 14,5 17,2 15,6
Whites:
1998 4,0 5, I -** -** 3,9 5,0 4,4
1999 4,4 5,3 -** -** 4,4 5, 1 4,7
*
14
Female 0 Total I
Figure 2.4 Official Unemployment Rates By Race And Gender,
February 2001
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As Table 2.3 and Figure 2.4 indicate, the official unemployment rates are highest for
economically active Africans, followed by Coloureds, Indians and then Whites. This pattern
holds for both economically active urban and non-urban males and females separately and when
males and females were combined. For all population groups , unemployment was higher
among women than among men. For example in 1998, among the African group 38,4% of
women as opposed to 29,5% ofmen were unemployed.
Table 2.4 sets out the number of unemployed by level of education for 1999. The relationship
between education and unemployment is curvilinear. In 1999 of those with no education
16,9% were unemployed, rising to 27,6% among those with some education, but no Grade 12
(matric), and dropping thereafter to 19,5% among those with Grade 12 (matric) or higher
qualifications (unemployment rates calculated from Table 2.4). Although it is unusual to find
higher unemployment rates among those with incomplete schooling than among those with no
schooling, the World Bank /SALDRU study of poverty found the same association. Statistics
South Africa (1998 : 26 - 27) suggests that a partial explanation for this is that a large
proportion of people hold elementary occupations (about 18% of the employed), which are
probably most suitable for people with no education. Table 2.5 breaks down the employed by
occupation. The greatest number of employed are found in elementary occupations followed
by craft and related trades, and service, shop and market sales.
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Loot s (1998 : 323) argues that the high incidence of unemployment among people with a grade
12 (matric) qualification (24,9% in 1999) indicates that the current school system is not geared
to equip school leavers with the skills required by the labour market. Mathibela (cited in
Loots, 1998 : 323) believes that the current education system is biased in that it produces job
seekers and not job creators.
Table 2.4 Unemployment By Level Of Education, Based On The Official Definition Of
Unemployment, October 1999
sample size too small for reliable estImates. Due to roundmg numbers do not necessar ily add up to totals
Source: Statistics South Africa : Statistical Release P0317.
N in 'OOOs
Level of education Employed Unemployed Total Unemployment
economically rate (official)
active
Total 10 369 3 158 13527 23,3
None 742 151 893 16,9
Grade 1- 3 475 133 608 21,9
Grade 4 334 109 443 24,6
Grade 5 416 129 545 23,7
Grade 6 528 183 7 11 25,7
Grade 7 697 258 955 27,0
Grade 8 829 304 1 133 26,8
Grade 9 597 282 879 32,0
Grade 10 908 328 1236 26,5
Grade 11 575 312 887 35,0
Grade 12 2 340 775 3 115 24,9
NTC I 10* 3* 13* 23*
NTC II 15 2* 17* 11,8*
NTC III 68 8* 76* 10,5*
Diploma/certificate with GIl 162 19 181 10,5
or lower
Diploma/cert ificate with G12 747 101 848 11,9
Degreelhigher 677 33 710 4,6
Other 15 1* 16 6,3*
Unspecified 234 27 261 10,3
*
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Ta ble 2.5 The Employed By Occupation, October 1999
Main occupation group Total (in ' OOOs)
Total Male Female
Total 10369 6009 4 353
Legislators, senior officials and managers 684 511 171
Professionals 554 300 253
Technicians, and associated professionals 1042 488 553
Clerks I 071 371 699
Service workers and shop and market sales I 225 684 541
workers
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 469 349 120
Craft and related trades workers I 355 I 153 202
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 1 092 933 158
Elementary occupation s I 901 1066 835
Domestic workers 799 36 763
Not elsewhere defined 0* 0* 0*
Occupation not adequately defined 138 96 43
Occupation unspecified 39 22 16
*sample size too small for rel iable estimates. Due to rounding, numbers may not necessarily add up to totals
Source: Statistics South Africa , Statistical Release P03 17.
Unemployment in South Africa tends to be a long-term phenomenon. In 1997, at least one-
third of the unemployed had been unemployed for three years or more, and at least another..
quarter had been unemployed for between one and three years (Stats S.A., 1998 : 29). Long-
term unemployment is equally common among men and women. In 1997 the proportions of
men and women who had been looking for work for three or more years were much higher
among Africans (41% and 43% respectively) than among coloured (17% and 21%), Indians
(9% and 15%) and whites (6% and 17%) (Stats S.A., 1998 : 29).
2.3 ECONOMIC GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Barker (1999b : 77) identifies low economic growth and high population growth rates as the
primary reasons for the high levels of unemployment in South Africa. The notion exists that an
improvement in material welfare and the standard of living can be attained through high-quality
economic growth automatically leading to an expansion in income-generating employment
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opportunities (Loots, 1998 : 324). Typically, stronger economic activity gives rise to faster
employment growth while weaker economic activity is accompanied by slower employment
growth (Erasmus and Weideman, 1995 : 25).
Cyclical changes in employment levels in the late 1980s and 1990s differed significantly from
those of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Erasmus and Weideman (1995 : 27-29) found that
employment levels in the later years reacted less positively to changes in economic growth than
previously. During the recessions of the 1970s employment continued to increase whereas the
recessions of the late 1980s and early 1990s saw absolute declines in employment levels.
Employment growth was also weaker during the upswings of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The contraction in private sector employment was much more rapid during recent economic
slowdowns, whereas the expansion in private sector employment during economic upswings
occurred much more slowly than previously (Erasmus and Weideman, 1995 : 27-29). This
suggests that South Africa's unemployment problem is becoming increasingly structural. Even
high economic growth cannot create sufficient employment opportunities to absorb the
unemployed and first-time entrants to the labour force. The economy has experienced six
successive years of positive real economic growth and yet remains unable to provide
employment opportunities necessary for the growing population. South Africa has been
experiencing the phenomenon of jobless growth, where employment falls even during periods
of positive economic growth. Table 2.6 shows the growth in real gross domestic product and
formal employment, and the employment coefficient in selected periods.
Table 2.6 Economic Growth And Growth Of Formal Employment
Growth rate (% p.a .) in period indicated
Growth of non-agricultural, formal emp loyment
Source : I - Barker 1999b : 83
2 - ca lculated from SARB Quarterly Bulletin, September 200 I
1961- 1973- 1979- 1985- 1994- 19972 19982 19992 20002
721 781 841 931 971
Real GDP 5,3 2,9 3, I 0,6 2,8 2,5 0,7 1,9 3, 1
growth
Employment 2,6 2,2 1,4 -0,2 -0,18 -1,7* -3,5* -1,9 * -2,7*
growth




The employment coefficient (defined as the percentage change in employment divided by the
percentage change in gross domestic product) is a crude indication of the responsiveness of
employment to changes in economic growth. The lower the employment coefficient, the
fewer jobs are created and the greater the level of real economic growth required to reduce the
country's unemployment and underemployment problems. As Table 2.6 shows, the
employment coefficient rose from 0,49 in the 1960s to 0,76 in the 1970s. However labour
shortages caused partly by apartheid policies and partly by high economic growth, kept the
employment coefficient lower than it would otherwise have been. The employment coefficient
then fell sharply from 0,76 in 1973-78 period to 0,45 in 1979-84 period indicating that much
less employment was being created for each percentage point of economic growth (Barker,
1999b : 83). Thereafter the employment coefficient turned negative. This trend has been
maintained to date indicating that jobless growth has been occurring.
Structural unemployment anses as a result of skills or regional mismatches ansmg from
workers being unemployable because their skills have become technologically redundant or
there is no demand for them in the region where they live (Hargreaves-Heap, 1987 : 745).
The South African economy has undergone a significant structural change since the 1970s as
shown in Table 2.7.
Table 2.7 Share Of Economic Activity In GDP, 1970 - 1998 (%)
Period Agr/ Min&Qrr Manufaet Elee, Gas Construt Whols/ Fin/RE/ Other
Forest! & wate r Retail! Bus Sves Services
Fishing Catr
1970 8.3 10.3 24.2 2.6 4.3 15.1 11.1 24.1
1975 8.1 12.1 22.8 2.3 5.2 1 14.0 12.5 23.0
1980 6.9 2 1.7 22.2 3.6 3.5 11.3 10.8 20.0
1985 5.7 14.9 22.0 4. 1 3.6 11.5 13.5 24.7
1990 5. 1 9.4 24.7 4.2 3.4 14.6 14.0 24.6
1995 4.3 7.8 24.3 4.0 3.1 16.3 17.0 23.2
1998 4.3 7.8 23.7 3.9 2.8 15.9 18.6 22.8
Change -4.0 -2.4 -0.5 1.3 -1.5 0.8 7.6 -1.2
70-98
Source. Stryker, Cassim, Rajaratnam, Bhorat, Leibrandt and Plunkett , 200 1 : 27
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This structural change has contributed to the rise in number of unskilled people who are
unemployed. The primary sector, which includes agriculture, forestry and fishing, and mining
and quarrying, has become a less significant contributor to real gross domestic product. The
secondary sector 's' share of GDP has remained relatively constant although the manufacturing
and construction sectors ' contribution to national output has grown gradually smaller. The
tertiary or service sector" has grown significantly and currently contributes about 65 percent to
the national income. However this sector is characterised by a low demand for less-skilled
workers. The service sector' s increasingly predominant role is in line with the experience of
many of the developed countries where "[e]mployment in the industrial and manufacturing
sectors typically shows a strong tendency to increase and then ultimately to decrease as capital
substitutes for labour and services gain an increasing share of maturing economies" (Stryker et
al, 2001 : 29).
The South African Reserve Bank identifies a number of other factors that have contributed to
the weak labour absorption capacity of the South African economy. Firstly, since the early
1990s, firms have been restructuring with the aim of improving international competitiveness.
The result has been a reduction in employment. Secondly, firms have exhibited a preference
for capital-intensive as opposed to labour-intensive production processes. Thirdly, the
introduction of new production technologies is most often accompanied by a greater demand
for the small number of highly skilled workers and a lower demand for the country 's abundant
less-skilled workers . Fourthly, the domestic economy's capacity to create new jobs was
negatively impacted by the decline in the investment ratio. Lastly, the government is in the
process of restructuring the public service in order to improve the efficiency of service delivery.
2.4 SUMMARY
It is clear that South Africa has a serious unemployment problem by any standard.
Unemployment is concentrated among the disadvantaged groups, particularly African females.
A further legacy of Apartheid policies is that the majority of the unemployed are poorly
educated and unskilled. Where the structure of the South African economy is in accordance
3 The secondary sector includes manufactur ing, electricity and other utilities, and construction.
4 The tert iary sector includes trade, transport, financial and business services, and social, personal and
community services .
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with that of a developed country that of the labour force is not. Faster economic growth will
thus be accompanied by more jobs for the highly skilled exacerbating inequalities already
pervasive in the country. The challenge is to encourage growth that is labour-intensive with
respect to less-skilled workers and to re-equip the labour force so that they increasingly
possess the skills that are in demand.
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3 UNEMPLOYMENT: THE POSSIBLE CAUSES
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Unemployment is a complex and far-reaching problem with a wide variety of potential causes
and an equally wide variety of policy responses (Snower and de la Dehesa, 1997 : xxi).
Unemployment is most often the result of several simultaneous causes, all interacting with each
other. This chapter considers the possible causes of and comments briefly on the policy
responses to the unemployment problem with particular reference to countries belonging to the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
3.2 SUPPLY SIDE SHOCKS
Unemployment started to rise in most DECD countries in the early 1970s. Bean (1994 : 574 -
575) plotted the rate of growth of the GNP / GDP deflator against the unemployment rate for
four DECD regions namely the United States of America, the European Community, non-EC
Europe and Japan over the 1967 - 1992 period. This revealed that the period of rising
unemployment during the mid - 1970s was accompanied by rising rather then falling inflation
which he argues suggests the presence of supply rather than demand shocks. The disinflation
process during the first half of the 1980s was accompanied by a much greater increase in
unemployment in the United States of America and the European Community than elsewhere.
Thereafter inflation stabilized at a low level, and while the unemployment rate in the United
States of America returned to its former level that of the European Community did not, which
suggests that the natural rate of unemployment itself must have risen over this period. Over
the 1990s unemployment rates started to fall in certain European countries (Netherlands,
Denmark and Ireland) and the United Kingdom. These falls in unemployment have generally
occurred without any increase in inflation, which suggests that the improvements are structural
(Elmeskov, 2000 : paragraph 6).
As unemployment started to rise in the 1970s, explanations focused on the role of adverse
shocks. The adverse shocks identified by Fitoussi, Jestaz, Phelps, and Zoega (2000 : 238)
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were: I) the productivity growth slowdown which became evident in the 1970s and led to
increases in the effective cost of capital; 2) the increase in the expected world real rate of
interest which took place in the early 1980s and once again raised the effective cost of capital;
3) the increases in income and services from workers' private assets; 4) the increase in the
level and range of benefits from social entitlements relative to after-tax wage levels which arose
from the productivity slowdown in the 1970s and the growth of equity considerations in the
1960s and 1970s; and 5) the oil price increases of the 1970s. These shocks were followed by
sharp increases in unemployment. However, whereas unemployment levels in the United
States of America had returned to pre-shock levels by the end of the 1980s, those in Europe
had not.
These adverse shocks have contributed to unemployment (see Fitoussi et at (2000) and
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)), but as Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) found, they do not differ
to the extent of being able to account for the cross-country variations evident in European
unemployment. Furthermore, these adverse shocks cannot alone account for the persistence
of high unemployment. The real price of oil had fallen back to its pre-shock level by the late
1980s. Furthermore, one would expect that by the 1990s workers' aspirations would have
adjusted to lower levels of productivity growth. Both firms and workers take time to adjust to
a slowdown in total factor productivity growth. During this adjustment process, wages will
rise too fast relative to total factor productivity growth resulting in a decrease in employment,
both directly and through lower profits and lower capital accumulation (Blanchard, 2000 :
297). This shifted the search for the causes of unemployment to labour market rigidities,
hysteresis and skill-biased technological progress.
3.3 LABOUR MARKET RIGIDITIES
Conventionally, the following rigidities are considered the most important obstacles to the
efficient operation of the labour market:
• Restrictions on hiring and firing, and other employment protection legislation that will
increase the cost oflabour, and lead to reduced flexibility and higher unemployment.
• Trade unions and the wage setting structure - it is argued that trade unions, in attempting to
raise the wages of members and reduce the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled,
destroy jobs and may reduce productive efficiency through restrictive practices.
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• Benefit systems and the treatment of the unemployed - the purpose of such systems are to
maintain or protect the standard of living of the unemployed. The gap in living standards
between those out of work and those in work is reduced, but so are the incentives to finding
or keeping a job. However active labour market policies will serve to offset the negative
effect that generous unemployment benefits oflong duration have on unemployment.
• Minimum wages - where minimum wages are set above the levels prevalent ill the
unregulated labour market, workers will be priced out of employment.
• Levels of labour taxation.
In assessing the role these factors play in determining unemployment rates it is useful to
consider how they fit into an integrated framework. Figure 3.1 depicts Scarpetta's simple
model of equilibrium in the labour market. Scarpetta (1996 : 45) assumed imperfectly
competitive profit-maximizing firms, each facing exogenously determined product market
conditions with a fixed stock of capital and technology. It is assumed that workers and firms
bargain over wages and that once a wage agreement has been arrived at, firms unilaterally
select a level of employment, output and prices. The model is static in that it ignores labour
force growth and future trends in productivity.
The rate of structural unemployment (u*) is determined by the intersection of the labour
demand and wage setting curves in the employment/real wage space (see Figure 3.1). The
equilibrium rate of unemployment will be increased by any factor that exogenously increases
any of the wage push variables or the variables that influence labour demand. The wage push
factors include the following: employment protection, the relative strength of unions and the
structure of the wage bargaining process, generosity of the unemployment benefit system, the
effect of the tax wedge on the use oflabour, and the degree of mismatch between the skills and
geographical location ofjob seekers, and those of the unfilledjob vacancies. Furthermore, any
change in the factors influencing the decision to participate in the labour force will shift the
full-employment curve (LS), thereby altering the measured level of structural unemployment.
The speed with which the labour market responds to exogenous shocks may also be affected by
the institutional and policy variables that enter the wage setting equation.
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Source: Scarpetta, 1996 : 46
(1 - u*)
Employment rate (1 - u)
Persistence mechanisms may be incorporated into the bargaining model by permitting wages to
be a function of both the level of and the change in unemployment. Scarpetta (1996 : 48)
justifies this specification of the wage setting schedule in terms of the behaviour of both firms
and workers. He argues, "High hiring and firing costs may introduce inertia in the firm's
employment decisions. On the basis of the ' insider-outsider' hypothesis, it could also be
argued that real wages may be more responsive to the threat of large-scale redundancy and
rising unemployment than to the level of unemployment per se. Likewise, in the context of
rising unemployment, the proportion of short-term unemployed (i.e. those most likely to
compete directly with the unemployed) generally increases and this could put more downward
pressure on wages than a stable level of unemployment".
The mechanisms by which labour market institutions and policy variables impact on
unemployment are described in more detail below.
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Employment Protection
The usual rationale behind legislating the labour market is to protect employees from arbitrary,
unfair or discriminating actions on the part of employers. Legislation affecting the treatment
of employees includes regulations on working hours, annual leave, health and safety, employee
representation rights, workers' compensation insurance, fixed term contracts and employment
security (Nickell and Layard, 1999 : 3039). Such legislation could raise the cost of employing
workers and/or raise the actual cost of adjusting levels of employment (Nickell, 1997 : 66).
The effect that the former has on unemployment hinges on the degree to which these additional
cost s are borne by the employees through wage adjustments.
Employment protection impacts on the functioning of the labour market in a variety of ways.
The rate at which people leave unemployment is slowed, to the particular detriment of the less-
skilled and the long-term unemployed, as firms become more prudent and selective about
hiring. On the other hand employment protection legislation may result in more efficient job
matching due to a more proficient human resources division. Hence the effect of such
legislation on outflows from unemployment could go either way.
However employment protection also reduces involuntary dismissals thereby lowering the
inflow into unemployment. Such legislation may also have a direct impact on wages paid since
the increased job security enjoyed by "insiders" (i.e. the employed) may encourage them to
demand higher pay increases (Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini, 2001 : 7).
Trade Unions and the Wage Setting Structure
The structure of wage determination is a key factor affecting equilibrium unemployment. A
variety of structures may exist within a particular country. Wages may be established in a
largely competitive manner in certain sectors, while in others wages may be determined
collectively at plant, firm, industry or national level. The overall impact of the wage setting
structure on unemployment is dependent on union power in wage bargains, union coverage and
the extent to which wage bargains are coordinated (Nickell and Layard, 1999 : 3041).
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In general, greater union power and coverage will generate upward pressure on wages leading
to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However this increase can be offset if wage
bargaining is coordinated . Common in decentralized, uncoordinated, union-dominated
systems is ' leap-frogging' - each union identifies an earlier wage settlement in a related sector
and aims to exceed this figure in its negotiations. 'Leap-frogging' is thus an additional source
of inflationary pressure, requiring more unemployment to offset it. However, the coordination
of wage bargaining activities by employers and unions will overcome the negative effects of
' leap-frogging' (Nickell, 1997 : 68). One should note that coordination is not synonymous
with centralization which refers to the level (plant, firm, industry or national) at which
collective bargaining occurs. Scarpetta (1996 : 54) explains coordination as " .. . the extent to
which decisions taken by trade unions and employers' associations at the different bargaining
levels... are concerted so as to foster a mutually beneficial strategy".
Minimum Wages
Minimum wages are widespread in the OECD (Nickell and Layard, 1999 : 3069). However,
on surveying the evidence, Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3069) conclude that minimum wages are
typically set low enough not to have a significant impact on adult male unemployment,
although there is some evidence that youth unemployment rates are increased.
Benefit Systems and Active Labour Market Policies
Benefit systems impact on unemployment in two ways. First, they reduce the fear of
unemployment thereby lowering the willingness of insiders to temper their wage claims in the
face of unemployment pressure (Scarpetta, 1996 : 52). Second, benefits may be expected to
raise beneficiaries' reservation wages, which will have a negative effect on their search efforts
and their willingness to accept job offers. Generous and long-term benefits will therefore
increase unemployment particularly in the long run. However, causality could run from
unemployment to benefits rather than the other way round, with countries introducing more
generous benefit systems when unemployment is high (Nickell, 1997 : 67).
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Benefits systems also have important implications for the persistence of unemployment since
the longer one is unemployed the less likely one is to be hired. As time passes the skills of the
unemployed may deteriorate making them less desirable as job fillers. Furthermore, to the
extent that firms use the length of workers' unemployment spells as an indication of their
potential productivity, the long-term unemployed will have a lower probability of being hired
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 : 174).
Active labour market policies include, inter alia, training and retraining programmes, job-
search counselling, job brokerage services and various forms of subsidized employment, and
are aimed at increasing the ability and willingness of the unemployed to acquire jobs . Active
policies combined with benefits offered for relatively short period of time appear to be
successful in lowering long-term unemployment while reducing the social distress that could
accompany the discontinuation of benefits without active assistance toward finding
employment.
Labour Taxes
Labour taxes affect the wage setting process and factor utilization (Scarpetta, 1996 : 53).
Taxes on labour operate via the wedge between the real cost of a worker to an employer and
the real consumption wage of the worker. Following Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3037),
consider the case of a representative firm in a closed economy producing gross domestic
product (GDP). The real labour cost per worker is W/P where W is the nominal labour cost
per worker and P is the GOP deflator (at factor cost) . The corresponding consumption wage,
assuming workers consume GDP, is
W(1 - t l)(1 - h) / P(1 + h) where tl is the payroll tax, h is the income tax rate and h is the
consumption tax rate. The tax wedge is (1 - t l)(1 - t2) / (1 + t3) == [1 - (tl + t2 + t3)] . For
example, if t I , t2 or h increase, the real consumption wage will have to fall if firms' real labour
costs per employee are not to increase. If this fall doesn't occur, unemployment will rise
(Nickell et ai, 2001 : 8).
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3.3.1 EVIDENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABOUR
MARKET REGULATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT.
A large volume of econometric work aimed at ascertaining the determinants of unemployment
exists. These studies usually involve regressing the unemployment rate on a set of variables
thought to affect unemployment, or an estimation of a system of equations from which the
determinants of unemployment may be deduced (Gregg and Manning, 1997 : 399 - 400).
In 1996 Layard, Jackman and Nickell attempted to determine whether the solution to lower
unemployment is greater labour market flexibility. They investigated the effect that differences
of labour market policy and institutions have on unemployment levels in the different OECD
countries using annual data over the 1983 - 1994 period. They found that unemployment is
strongly influenced by the treatment of the unemployed (i.e. unemployment benefit systems)
and by the method of wage determination. Ceteris paribus, greater union coverage is found to
have a negative effect on employment but greater coordination in the bargaining process tends
to offset the effect. However they found no clear evidence that employment protection or
employment taxes affect equilibrium unemployment.
Scarpetta (1996) performed a similar exercise for a group ofOECD countries using an annual
panel from 1983 - 1993. Scarpetta's results are similar in terms of the effects of
unemployment benefits, unionisation, coordination in the wage bargaining process, and
employment taxes on unemployment. However, although Scarpetta found that employment
protection has a significant effect on unemployment, the effect disappears when an index of
centralization is included. The impact of active labour market policies on unemployment is
found to be small and negative as expected.
Gregg and Manning (1997 : 404 -407) carried out single variable regressions of a variety of
measures of labour market performance, namely the unemployment rate in 1990; the change in
unemployment rate given by the difference between the 1985-9 average and the 1960-4
average; and the percentage of unemployed who are considered long-term unemployed, on a
variety of measures of labour market regulation using available data for 16 OECD countries.
The benefit duration and the replacement ratio, trade union density and collective bargaining
coverage rates, the minimum wage relative to the average wage, and average job tenure and
the Bertola index ofjob security (an index ofjob security compiled by Bertola in 1990 from the
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rankings of Emerson (1988)) , were used as measures of the generosity of the social security
system, the bargaining power of workers, the strength of the minimum wage legislation, and
the strength ofemployment protection legislation, respectively.
They note (1997 : 406) , " .. .the most striking thing is that it is very rare to find any significant
relationship at all." Gregg and Manning (1997 : 406) thus conclude, " There is simply no
strong evidence for the conventional view that regulation is associated with poor
unemployment performance". However their results are contrary to other findings and should
be treated with caution since they are based on single variable regressions, a questionable
technique given the acknowledged existence of complementary effects of labour market
rigidities on unemployment (see Coe and Snower, 1997).
In 1999 Nickell and Layard produced an extensive summary of the theory and facts pertaining
to the labour market rigidity debate. They looked at separate features of the labour market and
attempted to identify those responsible for the high levels of unemploymentI in many European
countries. The following direct measures of labour market rigidities and statistics summarizing
the treatment of the unemployed were considered/ (Nickell and Layard, 1999 : 3037 - 3048):
1. The employment protection index, as drawn up by the OECD and based on the strength of
the legal framework regulating hiring and firing. Countries are ranked from 1 to 20, with
20 indicating the strictest regulation.
2. The labour standards index which was drawn up by OECD and is based on the strength of
the legislation governing certain aspects of the labour market. The index ranges from 0 to
10 and is the sum of each country's score on each of five factors. Each country is awarded
points from 0, indicating weak or no legislation, to 2, indicating strict legislation, on each
of the following factors: working hours, fixed-term contracts, employment protection,
rrurumum wages and employees' rights to representation (on work councils, company
boards etc.).
3. The benefit replacement rate which indicates what share (percentage) of income is replaced
by unemployment benefits.
4. The duration of unemployment benefits.
I Table A I in Appendix A sets out the total , short-term and long-term unemployment rates in the OECD
member countries for the period under consideration.
2 Data on the rig idities affecting the treatment of the unemployed are presented in Table A2 in Appendix A.
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5. Active labour market policies which constitute expenditure on activities aimed at helping
the unemployed back into work such as labour market training, assistance with job search,
subsidised employment and special measures for the disabled. This measure is calculated
by taking active labour market spending per unemployed person as a percentage of GDP
per member of the labour force.
6. The percentage of households who are owner-occupiers is included as a measure of
barriers to geographical mobility.
Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3038 - 3042) also included the following variables' as descriptors
of the structure of wage determination systems:
7. The union density which gives the proportion of trade union members as a percentage of all
wage and salary earners.
8. The union coverage index which indicates the share of workers actually covered by
collective agreements . A value of 3 indicates that 70 percent are covered, 2 a coverage of
25 to 70 percent , and 1 represents below 25 percent .
9. The degree of union and employer coordination in wage bargaining ranked from a low of 1
to a high of3 .
10. Countries are also ranked following Calmfors and Driffill (cited in Nickell and Layard,
1999 : 3042) on the degree of centralization with the most centralized economy scoring 17
and the least 1.
11. The payroll tax rate (t i) which is given by the ratio oflabour costs to wages (less unity)
and includes pension and other compulsory payments by employers.
12. The total tax rate which is the sum of the average payroll, income and consumption tax
rates and provides a rough measure of the tax wedge between real labour costs and take-
home pay.
In investigating the relationship between unemployment and labour market institutions, Nickell
and Layard (1999) conducted three cross-country regressions. Each regression was based on
two cross-sections dated 1983 - 1988 and 1989 - 1994. The dependent variables were the logs
of the unemployment rate, the long-term and the short-term unemployment rates. This means
that should the log unemployment increase by 0.1, then unemployment would rise by just over
10 percent. The independent variables were the direct measures of labour market rigidities and
3 Data on the variables capturing the structure of the wage determination systems in OECD countries are
presented in Table A3 in Appendix A.
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statistics summarizing the treatment of the unemployed and the variables impacting the wage
determination structure as outlined above. Six-year averages were used to smooth out the
cycle and year-on-year noise. The standard generalized least squares procedure , which is in
effect ordinary least squares corrected for the fact that the two successive observations for
each country cannot be treated as independent and random, was used to estimate the
regression coefficients. Given that the unemployment rates are the actual unemployment rates
as opposed to the equilibrium unemployment rates which are influenced by the labour market
institutions, Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3052) captured the difference between the two by
including the rate of change of inflation. Results of the regressions are set out in Table 3.1.
Only those variables that are reasonably significant are reported.
Table 3.1 Regressions To Explain Log Unemployment Rate (%)




Total Tax Rate (%) 0.027 (4.0) 0.023 (1.6) 0.028 (3.5)
Employment Protection ( 1-20) 0.052 (1.4) -0.061 (2.8)
Replacement Rate (%) 0.013 (3.4) 0.01 1 (1.3) 0.01 3 (2.6)
Benefit Duration (years) 0.10 (2.2) 0.25 (2.7) 0.045 (0.8)
Active Labour Mark et Policies -0.023 (3.3) -0.039 (2.8) -0.097 (1.2)
Union Density (%) 0.010 (2.3) 0.010 (1.0) 0.003 I (0.5)
Union Coverage Index (1- 3) 0.38 (2.7) 0.83 (2.3) 0.45 (2.1)
Co-ordination (Union + -0.43 (6. 1) -0.54 (3.6) -0.34 (3.8)
Employer) (2-6)
Change In Inflation (% pts. -0.21 (2.2) -0.30 ( 1.6) -0.29 (2.7)
p.a.)
Dumm y for 1989-94 0.15 ( 1.5) 0.30 (1.8) 0.092 (1.0)
R2 0.82 0.84 0.73
N (countr ies, t ime) 40 (20, 2) 38 (19, 2) 38(1 9,2)
t ratio s In parenth eses
Source: Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3053)
In the Nickell and Layard regressions high labour standards, for example minimum wages, are
found to have no effect on unemployment. The coefficient of the labour standards variable in
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the unemployment regression is negligible and insignificant (the coefficient is 0.0011 with a t
ratio of 0.02) and hence it is not reported in Table 3.1. Although there is no evidence that
employment protection affects overall employment, this variable was found to increase long-
term unemployment and to reduce short-term unemployment. They found that both the benefit
replacement rate and the benefit duration have significant effects on unemployment. However
the negative effects of a relatively generous benefit system could be neutralized by appropriate
active policies aimed at encouraging the unemployed back to work. This does appear to be the
case. Their regression analysis found that active policy measures do have a significant effect
on reducing long-term unemployment (coefficient of -0.039 with a t ratio of (2.8)) . Owner-
occupation does appear to raise unemployment but Nickell and Layard (1999 : 3055) question
its effectiveness as an indicator of the barriers to entry since no correlation was found between
regional mobility and the percent ofhouseholds who were owner-occupied.
Nickell and Layard (1999) identified the important aspects of a wage determination system as
the degree to which wages are determined collectively, through union bargaining (union
coverage), and the degree to which employers and unions coordinate their wage bargaining
activities given that wages are determined collectively. The regressions showed that higher
union density and union coverage in particular increase unemployment. However, unions and
employers co-ordinating their bargaining activities offset this. The coordination variable has a
coefficient of -0.43 (6.1), -0.54 (3.6) and -0.34 (3.8) in the total unemployment, long-term
unemployment and short-term unemployment regressions respectively (t ratios in parentheses).
The coefficient of the centralization variable is insignificant. Thus the negative impact unions
have on employment will be neutralized when both unions and employers coordinate wage
bargaining activities.
Evidence shows that the burden of payroll taxes is usually shifted onto workers in the long run,
cancelling any impact on unemployment. The coefficient of the payroll tax rate was found to
be negligible in the regressions, which is confirmation of existing evidence suggesting that
reducing payroll taxes and increasing consumption taxes will have no long-term effect on
unemployment (Nickell and Layard, 1999 : 3053). Including the total tax rate in the
regressions indicates that the overall tax burden increases unemployment.
Nickell and Layard (1999) thus identified trade unions and benefit systems as the labour market
institutions most germane to European unemployment, and conclude that " ... time spent
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worrying about strict labour market regulations, employment protection and minimum wages is
probably time largely wasted." This is consistent with the results of a cross-section study of
OECD countries conducted by Nickell in 1997. He found that the following labour market
features contributed to unemployment: "1) generous unemployment benefits that are allowed
to run on indefinitely, combined with little or no pressure on the unemployed to obtain work
and low levels of active intervention to increase the ability and willingness of the unemployed
to work; 2) high unionisation with wages bargained collectively and no coordination between
either unions or employers in wage bargaining; 3) high overall taxes impinging on labour or a
combination of high minimum wages for young people associated with high payroll taxes; and
4) poor educational standards at the bottom end of the labour market" (Nickell, 1997 : 72).
However it is argued that these models could not convincingly attribute the rise in
unemployment to greater labour market regulation. Gregg and Manning (1997 : 400) argue
that policy makers were aware of the fact that labour regulation had been increased in most
countries during the 1960s and 1970s and that unemployment had begun to rise from the late
1960s. Hence, in the 1980s policy makers adopted labour market policies that tended to
support deregulation. However, unemployment continued to rise in spite of these measures.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000 : C2) also note that labour market institutions, while potentially
able to account for the current heterogeneity of individual country experiences, are unable to
explain the general evolution of unemployment over time since "...many of these institutions
were already present when unemployment was low (and similar across countries), and, while
many became less employment friendly in the 1970s, the movement since then has been mostly
in the opposite direction." They suggest a shift in focus to the interaction of adverse shocks
with adverse labour market institutions. Fitoussi et al (2000 : 254) agree that labour market
institutions cannot account for the higher and higher levels of equilibrium unemployment
experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. They argue that the role that labour market
institutions may have played is to propagate the shocks that explain the rise in unemployment
rather than to originate them.
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3.3.2 .THE INTERACTION OF SHOCKS AND LABOUR MARKET
INSTITUTIONS
The current view on the interaction of shocks and labour market institutions is that labour
market institutions shape the effects of shocks on unemployment in two ways: first, by
affecting the impact of shocks on unemployment and second, by affecting the persistence of
unemployment in response to shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000 : CI7). Studies on the
first concentrated on how the innate characteristics and the details of collective bargaining
could determine the response of unemployment to various shocks. For example, centralized
wage negotiations could make coord inating a slowdown in wages in response to a shock
easier. However continued high unemployment shifted the focus to the second. In the normal
course of events, higher unemployment caused by an adverse shock will exert downward
pressure on wages until equilibrium unemployment has been re-established. However certain
labour market institutions serve to weaken the effect of unemployment on wages, thereby
increasing the persistence of unemployment in response to shocks (Blanchard and Wolfers,
2000 : CI7). For example, generous benefit systems and employment protection tend to
increase the duration of unemployment experienced by an individual. The longer an individual
is unemployed, the greater the erosion of his/her skills and the greater the probability that
he/she will cease searching for a job altogether. This unemployable nature of or the failure of
the long-term unemployed to actively seek work will result in their becoming irrelevant to the
wage setting process. The downward pressure of unemployment on wages will fall and the
persistence of unemployment will increase.
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) investigated the interaction between shocks and institutional
variables, employing five-year averages of the data on a panel of shocks and institutions for 20
DECD countries since 1960. They identified the following shock variables as having played an
important role in the increase in unemployment: the level of total factor productivity (TFP)
growth, the real interest rate and labour demand shifts (essentially the log of the labour share
purged of the effects of factor prices). The institutional variables employed correspond to
those used by Nickell and Layard (1999) and Nickell (1997), namely measures of the
replacement rate, the duration of unemployment benefits, active labour market policies,
employment protection, the tax wedge, union coverage, union density and union and employer
coordination of wage bargaining. Their empirical results lead them to conclude (C32) that " .. .
an account of the evolution of unemployment based on the interaction of shocks and
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institutions can do a good job of fitting the evolution of European unemployment, both over
time and across countries".
Nickell, Nunziata, Ochel and Quintini (2001) attempted to determine the extent to which the
long- term shifts in unemployment experienced by 20 GECD countries over the last four
decades could be explained by changes in labour market institutions over that time. They
identified the following variables as affecting equilibrium unemployment: the unemployment
benefit system, the real interest rate, employment protection legislation, barriers to mobility,
active labour market policies, union structures and the extent of coordination in wage
bargaining, labour taxes, terms of trade changes and shifts in trend productivity growth. The
latter three variables influence unemployment through their impact on wages. Employment will
fall if workers attempt to sustain recent wage growth when the rate consistent with stable
unemployment shifts unexpectedly due to either an increase in labour taxes, adverse shifts in
the terms of trade (increases in real import prices) or a fall in trend productivity growth
(Nickell et aI, 2001 : 8). The factors expected to explain the deviation in short-term
unemployment from equilibrium unemployment included aggregate demand shocks,
productivity shocks and wage shocks. They conclude that shifts in labour market institutions
can account for broad movements in unemployment across OECD countries. However this
result is dependent on high levels of endogenous persistence as reflected in a lagged dependent
variable coefficient ofaround 0,86 (Nickell et aI, 2001 : 38).
3.4 HYSTERESIS
Failure of movements in any exogenous factor to provide a probable explanation for the
seemingly permanent increase in equilibrium unemployment led to a shift in focus away from
the original source of the increase toward the question of how the effects of the shocks were
propagated over time (Bean, 1994 : 603). Hence in the mid-1980s explanations based on
hysteresis became popular.
Hysteresis is explained by Cross and Allen (1988 : 28) as follows, "If the behaviour of
economic systems in such equilibrium positions [that is partial, general, local temporary,
stationary, dynamic and spatial] can be explained by reference to present state variables alone
the systems can be said to be ahysteretic; if reference to the history of the relevant explanatory
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variables is required as well, the systems are hysteretic". The hysteresis theory of
unemployment thus holds that equilibrium unemployment is path-dependent, that is, it depends
on the history of actual unemployment. A change in actual unemployment could have a long-
lasting effect on equilibrium unemployment. High unemployment was held to be the outcome
of a very slow adjustment to the high actual unemployment caused by temporary shocks such
as the oil price increases of the 1970s and the tight monetary policies of the 1980s.
The behaviour of insiders, and the role played by the unemployed and particularly the long-
term unemployed have been identified, inter alia, as potential channels for hysteresis in
unemployment.
3.4.1 THE BEHAVIOUR OF INSIDERS
Involuntary unemployment means that there are individuals who are unemployed despite a
preference and a desire to work at the wages (normalized for productivity differences) received
by those currently in employment. In order to acquire employment, these individuals will offer
to work for less than the prevailing wage. The fact that unemployment persists in these
circumstances means that something or someone is able to prevent underbidding taking place
(Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 : 61). Government intervention through say minimum wage
laws, is a possible culprit as are firms and the employed.
In the insider-outsider theory, it is in the interests of the incumbent workers (insiders) to
prevent the unemployed from offering to work for less than the prevailing wage. According to
the theory workers have the ability to at least partially influence wage and employment
decisions (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 : 44). The theory is based on two fundamental
assumptions: as a result of labour turnover costs insiders are able to exert market power in the
wage setting process; and insiders apply this power in their own interests without giving full
consideration to other workers.
An illustration of an insider/outsider model is provided by Lindbeck and Snower (1988 : 3)
who see workers being divided into three groups:
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1) The insiders who are the experienced incumbent employees. Labour turnover costs ( i.e.
costs arising when workers join or leave a firm) protect the jobs of incumbent workers, making
it costly for firms to fire them and hire someone else in their place.
2) The entrants who are workers who have only recently been employed and whose positions
are presently not characterised by significant labour costs but who may achieve insider status in
the future.
3) The outsiders who have no protection and are either unemployed or participate in the
informal sector which offers very little if any job security. They are prepared to work for less
than insiders.
In this model hiring costs include the costs incurred in advertising for, screening, negotiating
with and training outsiders to replace insiders. Firing costs may include the implementation of
costly firing procedures, litigation, severance pay, and the possibility of strikes and low levels
of morale among the remaining workforce (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 : 1-2). Turnover
costs create economic rent since firms would be willing to pay to prevent a given level of
turnover. Insiders are assumed to have sufficient power to seize part of this rent in the form of
higher wages.
Insiders and firms negotiate wages on an individual or a collective (through a union) basis and
insiders plan their rent-seeking activities (ifany), considering the employment response to these
decisions. Firms then make the employment decision unilaterally, taking wages and rent-
creating activities as given (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 : 4). Insiders are able to push their
wages above the entrant wage and still keep their jobs since labour turnover costs may
neutralize any incentive firms may have to replace insiders with entrants. Furthermore, current
workers will find it in their self-interest to push entrants ' wages above the entrants' reservation
wage thereby limiting the firms' employment of entrants (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 : 170).
Hence while labour turnover costs will raise the insider wage, the entrant wage - unlike the
reservation wage - will not fall by an equivalent amount in present value terms. The labour
turnover costs will increase the present value of firms' wage costs of the marginal worker
causing firms to reduce employment (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 : 170).
Labour turnover costs discourage firms from hiring when the demand for labour increases and
from firing when the demand for labour decreases. Hence the consequence of an expansion in
economic activity will be the tendency for employment to remain relatively high while a
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consequence of a recession is the tendency for employment to remain lower than it would
otherwise have been. This raises employment inertia so that firms' current employment
depends more strongly on past employment (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 : 170).
The nature of macroeconomic fluctuations will also impact the influence that labour turnover
costs have on employment and unemployment, When business cycles are long and deep (as
was the case following the two oil price shocks in the 1970s and the adoption of restrictive
monetary policy in the 1980s and early 1990s) , labour costs may prove ineffective in
preventing labour cutbacks during the recessions, but they will discourage hiring in booms
because of the uncertainties surrounding the strength and the duration of the upswing
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2001 : 172). The overall effect on employment will thus be negative.
3.4.2 OUTSIDER CHARACTERISTICS
The second source of persistent unemployment focuses on the role played by the unemployed
and particularly the long-term unemployed in the wage determination process. Long periods of
unemployment tend to render people less employable either because employers use the length
of their unemployment as an indication of their potential as workers or because their skills
deteriorate making them less attractive to employers. This in turn causes discouragement and
eventually an end to the job search. When the demand for labour starts to increase again, it
will be the short-term unemployed who will find employment first and hence one could
consider the long-term unemployed as effectively no longer a part of the labour market. The
long-term unemployed are not considered by firms or viewed as competition by employed
workers, resulting in less downward pressure on wages than would be suggested by the over-
supply of labour and thus to an increase in the equilibrium rate of unemployment (The
Economist, 1994b : 74). Generous unemployment benefit systems will also contribute to the
persistence of unemployment by encouraging or enabling people to remain unemployed for
longer than they necessarily would in the absence of such systems.
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3.5 SKILL-BIASED TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
A popular explanat ion for the unemployment problem is that the opportunities for the less-
skilled have been declining relative to those for the skilled. The inability to compete with low-
wage labour in developing countries and technical progress that is biased against the unskilled
have been identified as reasons for this shift in demand away from the less-skilled.
It is argued that all countries have experienced an increase in relative demand for skilled
workers, as opposed to that of unskilled workers, that has exceeded the increase in their
relative supply. Juhn, Murphy and Topel (1991 : 76) found that in the United States of
America, " .. .the significant secular increases in unemployment, nonparticipation, and
nonemployment are heavily concentrated among less skilled individuals" . They conclude that
these increases are the result of reduced demand for unskilled workers. Between 1970 and the
late 1980s, real wages for workers in the bottom decile of the wage distribution fell by more
than 30 percent, while those of workers in the top 40 percent of the distribution remained
stable. The latter group experienced stable unemployment and participation rates while the
former experienced the greatest secular rises in unemployment and nonparticipation (Juhn et al,
1991 : 100). This evidence lends suppo rt to this view; "(t)aken together, the evidence
suggests that nonneutral changes in the long-run demand for labour , coupled with wages that
are flexible in the long-run, may be the major factor explaining changing jobless rates" (Juhn et
al, 1991 : 100).
This shift in demand is held to explain the majority of the increase in European unemployment
relative to that in the United States of America. However while inflexibility of the labour
market in Europe translated the shift in relative demand into greater unemployment, the flexible
labour market in the United States of America, converted the shift into increased earnings
inequality (Nickell, 1997 : 71).
The conclusion of this research is that although labour market regulation is not the fundamental
cause of labour market problems it does determine the form these problems take. Countries
that have institutions or measures in place (such as welfare grants, minimum wages and trade
unions) which aim to prevent increasing inequalities in income distribution will hinder
adjustments in relative wages and experience high unemployment particularly among the
unskilled as a result (Gregg and Manning, 1997 : 402). On the other hand, countries with
40
more flexible labour markets (for example the USA) have lower levels of unemployment, but
the wage/income inequalities between less-skilled and skilled workers is much greater.
Following the argument that real wages did not adjust sufficiently because of labour market
regulation, one would expect the divergence in the unemployment rates of the unskilled and the
skilled to be larger in Europe than in the United States of America. However Gregg and
Manning (1997: 402) point out that this is not in fact the case. They conclude that , "The
relative deterioration in the employment prospects of the least skilled does not seem to be
greater in the UK than the USA, which is a strong prediction of the theory that blames labour
market regulation and skill-biased change for current labour market problems".
Layard, Jackman, Manacorda and Petrongola (1997) attempted to determine the extent to
which changes in unemployment in Europe and the United States of America could be
attributed to changes in the skills mismatch. They found that in both Britain and the United
States of America imbalanced demand and supply changes had raised unskilled unemployment
and lowered skilled unemployment, although shifts in relative wage behaviour offset part of the
effect. Over the 1975 - 1992 period changes in the skills mismatch accounted for under a half
a percentage point increase in total unemployment in Britain. The relevant figure for the
United States of America over the period 1979 - 1988 was even smaller (Layard et ai, 1997 :
216). In addition no significant increase in skills mismatch was found for the European
countries studied. Over the 1980s wage differentials were found to have increased much less
in Europe than in the United States of America. However they note that this is unsurprising
given that the rate of skill formation was found to be much higher in Europe.
Furthermore history does not support the view that advances in technology lower the rate of
labour absorption and increase unemployment - technology advanced rapidly over the past two
centuries but unemployment did not rise (The Economist , 1995 : 21). In fact, accelerations in
technological progress are accompanied by accelerations in growth, living standards and
employment.
Two forms of technological advances exist. "Product innovation" is the introduction of
entirely new items, the demand for which generates jobs where none existed previously.
"Process innovation" involves the introduction ofnew machines and methods for more efficient
production of existing goods and hence unemployment may increase in the short-run.
41
However the extra demand produced in the economy could offset the initial labour-reducing
effects (The Economist, 1995 : 21). Increased productivity will lower costs, which will in turn
result in lower prices, higher wages and larger profits. Lower prices and higher wages will
raise real incomes and hence increase the demand for goods and workers. Ifhigher profits are
the outcome, the expansion in investment that results will also increase output and employment
(The Economist, 1995 : 21). New technology could only lead to permanently higher \
unemployment in the improbable and more likely impossible event that all consumer desires
have been fully satisfied and demand could not increase to match an increase in productive
capacity. New technology may however cause unemployment to rise in certain occupations
or regions. Technology does tend to destroy lower wage, lower productivity jobs and to create
more productive, high-skill and better-paid jobs (OEeD, 1994 : 33). The transition to new
technologies can therefore lead to a mismatch between the skills people possess and those that
are required. Lags between the destruction of old jobs and the creation of new ones may also
exist.
It is true that the faster productivity grows, the fewer jobs are created by a given rate of
growth. The demand for labour depends upon the relationship between productivity and
wages. Say, for example, productivity growth was reduced because firms invested less in
machinery. Then workers will have to accept smaller pay rises than before since if they do
not, the cost of hiring the "marginal" worker would exceed the value of his extra output and
unemployment would rise (The Economist, 1995 : 21).
The call for policies that increase labour market flexibility is challenged by an alternative view
that holds that the absorption of labour may not necessarily be increased by low wages and low
labour costs since factors, which make the use of labour-saving technology more profitable,
might exist (Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 54). As the use of technology increases, labour
costs become a less significant proportion of operating costs, and wage levels may thus have
relatively weak influences on business decisions. Policies advocated by proponents of this
view tend to involve improving wages, employee benefits and job security, on the grounds that
such measures are requisite for achieving improvements in labour productivity. The focus is
on what the government can do to increase the demand for labour and it is argued that
developing countries should follow expansionary fiscal policies despite the risk .of higher





inflation rate will be checked as production catches up with demand (Schlemmer and Levitz,
1998 : 54).
Regardless of whether a high technology or a demand-driven growth path is followed, any
labour market conditions and characteristics that inhibit labour absorption could exert upward
pressure on unemployment. Schlemmer and Levitz (1998) therefore argue that labour market
flexibility is imperative for either strategy. Labour market rigidities may, in the high
technology path and despite expansion, result in employers putting off increasing their
workforce for as long as possible, adopting instead better and better technology, perhaps even
before it is cost-effective. In the demand-driven route , a rigid labour market may reduce
industry profitability to the extent that production does not respond satisfactorily to the
markets created by fiscal expansion.
3.6 A NOTE ON POLICY RESPONSE
The dominant VIew among economists is that the cause of the progressrve nse in
unemployment in countries over the past 25 years can be found in the supply side of the
economy, particularly in the labour market (Gregg and Manning, 1997 : 395). It is held that
deregulation will move the labour market towards the perfectly competitive ideal in which all
can find employment, if they desire it, at a wage equal to the value of their contribution to
society. Although a completely deregulated labour market will still have some involuntary
unemployment possibly as a result of efficiency wage considerations or friction in the operation
of the market, the economy will be closer to market clearing (Gregg and Manning, 1997: 410).
Any form oflabour market regulation is thus seen to reduce the efficiencyof the labour market
and such regulation can only be vindicated on equity grounds.
However, Gregg and Manning (1997 : 396) believe that a more complex relationship exists
between labour market regulation and unemployment. They argue that labour markets are not
perfectly competitive and that a wholly unregulated labour market is unlikely to be efficient,
largely because it is probable that the market will be monopsonistic in nature for those groups
of workers most disposed to unemployment. Unskilled workers need to be granted or allowed
a level of bargaining power to countervail the monopsony power of firms and "aristocracy
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workers". The challenge is to determine the optimal amount and the form that the regulation
should take.
Gregg and Manning (1997 : 416 - 417) after studying a number of search and matching
models in order to determine the optimal amount of power that workers should have in wage-
setting, conclude, " The important point is that the optimal bargaining power of workers in
search and matching models is not zero, so that complete labour market deregulation should
not be expected to lead to efficiency". An optimal level of regulation needs to be adopted to
minimise unemployment.
Calaza (1997 : 425) supports this argument. The analytical framework of deregulation holds
that the labour market is more important than the goods and services market in overcoming
unemployment. He agrees that Keynesian measures are insufficient in counter-balancing
structural change problems, but maintains that the importance granted to the labour market is
over-estimated and leads to a bias in favour of certain economic policies which are
advantageous to firms rather than workers, even despite an original intention to benefit
workers. This bias would not be problematic if the outcomes reached were also accompanied
by a drastic reduction in unskilled unemployment. However, Calaza (1997 : 425) holds little
confidence in such a result since firms aim to maximise profits and not to generate
employment, and profits are derived from producing goods and services, not hiring labour. He
concludes (1997 : 425), " .. . the goods and services markets logically dominate the labour
market in order to create employment, even if the satisfactory functioning of the latter is a
necessary condition for full employment". The deregulation ofmonetary and financial markets
following the globalisation of the world economy has meant that a causal relationship between
profits and employment cannot be assumed. Profits generated by a decrease in salaries and
wages may be reinvested in the country leading to job creation, but investment opportunities in
financial markets outside the country may be equally or more attractive (Calaza, 1997 : 427).
This is one of the reasons, Calaza (1997 : 427) argues, for the incomplete validity of the
microeconomic conjecture that assumes a clear negative relationship between employment and
wage costs in the macroeconomic framework.
Coe and Snower (1997) assert that labour market institutions have complementary effects on
unemployment, that is, institutional rigidities reinforce each other, and hence policies aimed at
reducing these rigidities will also be complementary. Unemployment policy complementarities
44
are defined by Coe and Snower (1997 : 1) as follows, " .. .a group of policies is complementary
when the unemployment effect of each policy is greater when it is implemented in conjunction
with other policies than in isolation". European countries have been largely unsuccessful in
reducing unemployment since they have been implementing diverse, piecemeal labour market
reforms instead of undertaking "broad" and "deep" reforms. Coe and Snower (1997 : 22) do
recognize that reducing unemployment is not the only objective of policy makers who must
also provide support for the unemployed and job protection for the employed. The task
facing policy makers is thus to " ... find a set of complementary reforms that have a powerful
joint effect on unemployment without creating a socially undesirable widening of the
distribution of income" (Coe and Snower, 1997 : 22).
Coe and Snower (1997 : 32 - 33) identify the following as features that might be incorporated
in a fundamental reform programme:
1. Replacing passive income support measures with a negative income tax
conditional on employment or job search to achieve distributional
objectives with fewer adverse effects on incentives and employment
(Snower, 1995b), coupled with a substantial scaling back or elimination of
existing measures of passive income support;
2. reducing payroll taxes, particularly for low-wage workers ;
3. liberalisingjob security legislation;
4. reducing wage rigidities (such as those arising from minimum wages or
broad coverage of union wage agreements) to allow wage differentials to
better reflect productivity differences;
5. implementing measures to increase incentives for the acquisition and
provision of training, including allowing unemployed workers to transfer
benefits for training vouchers (Snower, 1995a);
6. introducing longer-run reforms to education systems to better prepare
students for the transition to work; and
7. taking measures to lower search costs by increasing worker mobility,
including reforms in the housing market and in the portability of pensions.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agrees that significant
synergies exist between structural reforms in different areas; "(s)eeing structural reforms as
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part of an overall strategy is also important because reforms in one area produce better results
if other areas are also reformed" (DECD, section IV, paragraph 1). For example, the full
benefits of greater product market competition will only be achieved if labour markets are
flexible enough to enable a prompt reallocation of labour .
A comprehensive policy reform may have a mitigating impact on some of the inherent policy
trade-offs. The GECD (section VI, paragraph 1) notes,
"By exposing wider segments of the population to structural reform, the process may be
perceived as more fair, reducing strains on social cohesion. And reforms which
negatively affect the real incomes of people without jobs will be perceived as less unfair
if they are accompanied by other reforms aimed at getting these outsiders back into
regular employment".
Consequently, the Job Strategy developed by the DECD involves a balanced and
comprehensive set of reform recommendations that are best implemented in a coordinated
manner . These recommendations were designed with the intention of improving countries'
capacities to be innovative and to adapt to change, and hence to increase employment. The
recommendations are as follows (GECD, 1994 : 43):
1. Set macroeconomic policy such that it will both encourage growth and, in
conjunction with good structural policies, make it sustainable .
2. Enhance the creation and diffusion of technological know-how by
improving frameworks for its development .
3. Increase flexibility of working-time (both short-term and lifetime)
voluntarily sought by workers and employers.
4. Nurture an entrepreneurial climate by eliminating impediments to , and
restrictions on, the creation and expansion ofenterprises.
5. Make wage and labour costs more flexible by removing restrictions that
prevent wages from reflecting local conditions and individual skill levels,
in particular ofyounger workers.
6. Reform employment security provisions that inhibit the expansion of
employment in the private sector .
7. Strengthen the emphasis on active labour market policies and reinforce
their effectiveness .
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8. Improve labour force skills and competences through wide-ranging
changes in education and training systems.
9. Reform unemployment and related benefits systems - and their interaction
with the tax system - such that societies' fundamental equity goals are
achieved in ways that impinge far less on the efficient functioning of
labour markets.
The success of the strategy is evidenced by the improved labour market outcomes in the
countries that have been most vigorous and conscientious in implementing it.
Developments in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Ireland have been
encouraging (unemployment rates in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Ireland have
fallen to their lowest levels since the 1970s); and support the view that a comprehensive
approach to reform brings greater benefits, even though their experience suggests that a
considerable time may elapse before the benefits are evident (GECD, section VI, paragraph
1).
3.7 SUMMARY
This chapter briefly considered the explanations of the European unemployment problem
provided by the authorities in this field, but it appears from the vast literature on the subject
that there is no single or easily identifiable cause of the rise in unemployment. While adverse
shocks acted in the direction of raising unemployment, they could not account for the
considerable heterogeneity or the persistence in unemployment levels across countries. The
possibility that labour market institutions or rigidities had had a role to play in propagating the
effects of adverse shocks on unemployment was then raised, leading to the emergence of a
broad consensus that European unemployment had its source in the interactions of adverse
shocks and adverse labour market institutions.
The policy response developed by the DECD' s 1994 Jobs Study is cognizant of the existence
of unemployment policy complementarities and suggests a balanced and comprehensive set of
reforms designed to improve countries ' capacities to be innovative and to adapt to change, and
consequently to raise employment. Country experience indicates that this suggested
comprehensive policy reform programme is associated with improved employment and
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unemployment performance, although the time taken for the positive effects to become evident
may be considerable.
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4 TRADE UNIONS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A trade union may be defined as an association of employees formed for the purpose of
improving the material welfare of its members, chiefly by raising wages above the competitive
level (Booth, 1995 : 51). Freeman and Medoff (1984 : 5-6) recognised trade unions as
having two faces, each leading to a different view of unions:
1) A monopoly face, associated with their monopolistic power to achieve wage gains; and
2) A collective voice or institutional response face, associated with their role as agents of
organised workers within firms.
The monopoly power of trade unions introduces an element of inflexibility into the labour
market. This chapter examines the effects of trade unions in the setting of perfectly
competitive product and labour markets. Two factors must be present if a trade union is to
achieve a wage rate that is greater than the competitive level. Firstly, economic rents or a
surplus must be available for sharing. Secondly, the union needs to possess a degree of
bargaining power sufficient to persuade the firm to share the surplus with union members.
The monopoly union model, which affords the simplest way of reconciling the objectives of the
firm and trade union, is considered. The impact that trade unions have on non-union workers
is then examined. Typically unions will attain a wage rate greater than the competitive level for
its members and in the process wages in the non-union sector will be pushed below the
competitive level. Provided the unionised labour market would have been competitive in the
absence of a union, unionisation will result in an efficiency loss and it is shown that the impact
on aggregate labour income in the economy will depend on whether the total wage bill after
unionisation is greater or less than the total wage bill before unionisation. The impact of trade
unions on productivity and employment is then analysed. Lastly, the effect of the wage
bargaining structure on aggregate unemployment is considered.
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4.2 THE ORTHODOX THEORETICAL VIEW OF TRADE UNIONS
4.2.1 TRADE UNIONS IN A PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE PRODUCT
MARKET
The ability of a trade union to secure a wage rate higher than the non-union wage depends on
the existence of economic rents or surplus in the product market, and on the extent to which
the union is able to behave as a monopolist in the supply of labour. Therefore, if they are to
be viable organisations, trade unions must either create a surplus, or be able to acquire a share
of the surplus previously captured by the firm. Economic rents have a variety of sources with
market imperfections or the regulation of the particular industry being the most likely. One
would therefore expect the probability of unionisation to be higher in non-competitive
industries than in competitive product markets, since where non-competitive firms or industries
make surpluses, unions will be able to achieve higher wages without undermining the viability
of the firm (Booth, 1995 : 53).
If a union is to capture any surplus in a perfectly competitive product market, the firm must be
making abnormal profits when employing workers (n) at the perfectly competitive wage (We).
In the equilibrium region the competitive firm's production function would have to be
characterised by decreasing returns to labour. The firm's total revenue product curve is given
by pq(n), where p is product price and q(n) is the production function. The firm's total factor
outlay curve is given by Wen where capital is assumed fixed in the short-run. We, the
competitive wage rate is exogenously given to the firm (it is determined by the interaction of
the industry labour demand and labour supply schedules). The firm's profits.n, are given by
1t = pq(n) - Wen.
The profits are greatest where the vertical distance between the total factor outlay curve and
the total revenue product curve is at its greatest. The union will be able to capture some of
the surplus if it can set wages at a rate greater than the competitive level. w* is the highest
wage it can set without pushing the firm out of business.
In a perfectly competitive market, the firm will face an exogenously determined wage rate, We.
The firm will hire labour until the marginal benefit ofhiring an additional worker is equal to the
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marginal cost of doing so. If the firm chooses labour n to maximise profits , the first order
condition from maximisation of the profit equation is given by
dn /dn = pq I (n) - We = 0
Therefore
pq ' (n) = We
The firm will hire labour until the value of the marginal product of labour (VMPL) given by
pq I (n) is equal to the wage rate that must be paid to this worker (We). Unions, given the
freedom of entry and exit of firms from the industry, may not be able to capture any surplus in
the long-run since in the long-run one would expect only the firms with the lowest costs to
survive, and abnormal profits would be eroded (Booth, 1995 : 55).
The existence of a surplus is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for union existence. In
addition unions must have sufficient power to force the firm to share the surplus with the
workers, or the firm must be prepared to share part of the surplus with the union in exchange
for behaviour that guarantees a larger surplus (with the consequence that the firm is not made
worse off). Workers may struggle to gain sufficient power to persuade firms to grant them a
share of the surplus. This is consistent with the Marxian analysis of the capitalist means of
production which argues that the production process is specifically selected by capitalists to
maintain their control over labour, and to ensure that labour as a class has no bargaining power
(Booth, 1995 : 56). Given the inherent conflict between employers and workers over work
effort and the costs involved in monitoring workers, employers find it in their interests to use
unemployment as a means of encouraging work effort . If employees receive a wage rate
greater than their next best alternative, there is some positive cost associated with being fired.
The equilibrium wages in such a labour market are above the market-clearing wage since the
market-clearing wage is associated with zero unemployment (this implies that the cost of job
loss is zero) . Such involuntary unemployment is associat ed with excess labour supply, which
means that labour as a class fails to achieve a position of bargaining strength necessary to
capture a share ofany surplus (Booth, 1995 : 56).
The question as to how the trade union acquires the monopoly power needed to capture a
share of the surplus arises. Unions are able to gain power primarily, although not exclusively,
through the threat of strikes provided that an alternative pool of substitute workers is
unavailable. It is therefore essential that unions are able to prevent firms from hiring alternative
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workers in the event of a labour withdrawal. This can be achieved by organising all the
workers, or most workers, in the industry, such that the union behaves as a monopolist in the
supply of labour. In other words unions need to control labour supply either by imposing
entry restrictions or, in the case of a fixed labour supply, by having high levels of membership
relative to the size of the sector. It is also important to note that union power is likely to be
closely related to the market power of the sector it organises. The ability of a union to
negotiate a large wage increase relative to the competitive level depends on the wage elasticity
of labour demand in that particular sector. Marshall's rules of derived demand describe the
factors affecting the elasticity of labour demand in the long-run and where capital is variable.
Firstly, the demand for labour will be influenced by changes in demand for the final product.
Secondly, labour demand will be affected by the degree of substitutability in production
between labour and other inputs. If the price of labour were to increase firms may be able to
substitute other inputs for labour. Thirdly, the share of labour in total costs will affect the
elasticity of labour demand. The smaller the share of labour costs in total costs, the smaller
the impact of an increase in the price of labour on total costs . Fourthly, labour demand will be
affected by the elasticity of supply of other inputs to the production process. (Booth, 1995 :
58)
4.2.2 THE MONOPOLY UNION MODEL
The monopoly union model provides the simplest method of reconciling the objectives of the
firm and the trade union. Traditional theory views a union as a monopoly that tries to secure
higher wages for its members. The union is assumed to set the wage unilaterally, subject to
the firm's labour demand curve. Once the wage is set, the firm is free to adjust employment to
the profit maximising level on the demand curve. The union knows how the firm will behave
in response to the wage it has set (Booth, 1995 : 97).
The union selects the highest possible level of utility, given the constraint of the firm's labour
demand curve. The optimum position (n*,w*) is thus achieved where the union equates its
marginal rate of substitution of employment for wages with the slope of the labour demand
curve. This is shown in Figure 4.1
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Source: Booth, 1995 : 98
Assume that the union maximises the expected utility ofa representative worker:
max EU = (nlt)u(w) + (1 - nit) u(b) (1)
subject to
pq' (n) = w
where n = employment in the union sector
t = total number of union workers in the sector
b = alternative sector wage or unemployment benefit
(2)
The first order condition of this maximisation problem can be determined by equating the slope
of the union indifference curve with the slope of the labour demand curve. Alternatively, once
the union has set its optimal wage , w*, equilibrium employment is found by equating w* with
the firm's labour demand curve pq '(n). The union's constraint can thus be written as
n = n(w/p) (3)
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Substituting (3) into (1) and maximising with respect to w, Booth (1995 : 99) obtained the
following result (p is equal to 1 for simplicity):
The union will set wages such that the percentage increase in a member's utility due to
a percentage increase in wages is exactly equal to the elasticity of labour demand (that
is, the percentage reduction in employment due to the percentage wage increase). This
is given by:
where
E = wu' (w)/[u (w) - u(b)]
E = -n' (w) wIn
(4)
The effect of the business cycle on the unionised sector of the economy is of particular interest.
Both labour demand and alternative opportunities (represented by b) are likely to be affected
by the business cycle. Since labour demand is a derived demand, an increase in product
demand will increase the demand for labour at each wage rate, and the labour demand curve
will shift to the right. However, the union wage remains unchanged provided that the
elasticity of labour demand is unaffected. Equation (4) shows that if s is fixed, the right-hand
side of (4) must remain unchanged, and thus wages will not be altered. Hence it can be
concluded that wages are rigid during fluctuations in product price, with all adjustments
occurring through employment instead (Booth, 1995 : 99).
An improvement in alternative opportunities, that is an increase in b, will only affect union
preferences, and not labour demand. The left-hand side of equation (4) remains unchanged by
the increase in b, and thus in order to keep the right-hand side of (4) also unaltered, w must
rise with an increase in b. This outcome suggests that if alternative opportunities worsen (b
falls), the union will relax its wage claims, thus leading to an increase in employment in the
unionised sector (Booth, 1995 : 100).
However, it is likely that the business cycle will have a simultaneous effect on labour demand
and alternative opportunities, b. Should the economy enter a recession, product demand and
alternative opportunities are both likely to decline. The decline in product demand will have
no effect on the union wage but it will result in a fall in employment. The decrease in b, on the
other hand, will reduce the union wage and raise employment. According to the monopoly
union model, the net effect of a recession would be for union wages to fall with an ambiguous
impact on employment. The effects of changes in alternative opportunities will be small if
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there exists little labour mobility between sectors in the short-run. In such a case one might
expect the negative effect of a fall in product prices to dominate and wages to be sticky. The
model therefore provides a microeconomic alternative to the implicit contract models of sticky
wages and unemployment (Booth, 1995 : 100 -101).
4.2.3 SPILLOVER AND THREAT EFFECTS (UNION EFFECTS ON
NON-UNION WORKERS)
Consideration of the impact of trade unions on relative wages requires the definition of two
concepts of wage differentials. First, the wage gain refers to the difference between the wages
paid to union members and the wages that these same workers would receive in the economy
with no trade unions at all, which would be the competitive wage rate. Secondly, the wage
gap refers to the difference in earnings between a union and non-union worker who are in
every other respect identical. The wage gap may be smaller than the true wage gain due to the
existence of threat effects, or larger due to the existence of spillover effects. Thus the ' true'
effects ofunionisation may be under or over-estimated by the wage gap (Elliot, 1990: 433).
The spillover (or 'crowding') effect suggests that employers in the union sector will reduce
employment given the successful negotiation of higher wages by unions, and that the demand
for labour in the union sector is not perfectly inelastic or that unions fail to negotiate efficient
contracts. Displaced workers 'crowd' into the non-union sector, and compete down wages in
that sector subject to the floor imposed by the welfare or social minimum (Elliot, 1990 : 433).
A simple general equilibrium model can illustrate this (see figure 4.2). Suppose that there are
only two sectors, A and B in the economy, and that initially there are no trade unions. The
labour demand curves for these sectors are given by LN° and Lvo in figure 4.2, and the length
of the horizontal axis measures aggregate labour supply in this economy. If the labour market
is competitive the wage rate will be W*/P and the labour supply will be fully employed. There
will be no incentive for workers to relocate since wages are equal in both sectors. Now
suppose that a union forms in sector A so that Lv° represents the demand for labour in the
unionised sector. Union preferences, as depicted by Uo, result in the negotiation of a union
wage WU/P. In consequence employment in the unionised sector is reduced, labour supply to
the non-union sector is increased and the wage rate in that sector is driven down to WN/P
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(where the supply of workers to sector B given by LX is equal to demand , at point C). OX
workers will be employed in the union sector and XL workers in the non-union sector. The
estimated wage gap that results (WU - WN)/WN will overstate the wage gain, (WU - W·)/W· ,
that results. Wages in the union sector will have risen while those in the non-union sector will
have fallen relative to the competitive benchmark (Elliot , 1990 : 433).
The threat effect suggests that employers may, for a variety of reasons, try to match the union
wages even though their labour force is not unionised. Employers may be forced to pay union
wages to recruit labour but perhaps they are most likely to pay union wages to prevent or pre-
empt unionisation, if they believe that the unions will impose additional costs, for example,
strikes that halt operations, or reductions in the ease with which they may deploy labour. No
wage gap will emerge, and the wage gains from unionisation accruing to union and non-union
members who remain in employment, will be understated. However, XY workers will now be
unemployed (Elliot, 1990 : 434).
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4.2.4 THE EFFECT OF TRADE UNIONS ON ALLOCATIVE
EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL WELFARE
The standard monopoly view of trade unions is that they distort factor prices resulting in
allocative inefficiency. Following Booth (1995 : 60 - 61) in the absence of trade unions
allocative efficiency is achieved when identical factor inputs are distributed so that their
marginal products across sectors are equalised. Given a fixed capital stock in the short-run,
union induced wage increases will change relative factor prices. Union firms will employ
fewer workers - in equilibrium the higher wage must be set equal to marginal product, that is,
union firms move up the negatively sloped labour demand curve. Those workers who have
lost their jobs in the union sector will enter the non-union sector , driving non-union wages
down.
Unionisation, provided the unionised labour market would otherwise have been competitive,
results in an efficiency loss. The total deadweight loss determined by the loss in producers '
surplus following unionisation, less the gain in the workers ' surplus, is given by triangle ABC
in Figure 4.2 (Booth, 1995 : 61). The impact on aggregate labour income (social welfare) in
the economy depends on whether the total wage bill after unionisation is greater or less than
the total wage bill prior to unionisation. Referring to figure 4.2, aggregate labour income will
increase if(O WU/PBX + XCWN/PL) > (OW*/PAZ + ZAW*/PL). A fixed surplus is available
for sharing and hence if labour as a class has gained the capitalists (employers) will have lost.
Capitalists will gain (or lose), depending on whether the post-unionisation return to capital
(given by the sum of triangles GBW/P and HCWN/P) is greater than (or less than) the pre-
unionisation return to capital (area GAW*/P and HAW*/P).
In the long-run, the capital stock is variable and an increase in the wage rate induced by a union
will cause the union firm to substitute relatively cheaper capital for more expensive labour (the
substitution effect). The higher price of labour will also affect the output produced by the
firm - the ratio of factor input price (W/r where W = wage rate and r = return to capital) will
increase and less output will be produced. The output effect may have either a positive or
negative effect on the demand for labour. The net effect may therefore be an increase or
decrease in labour demand depending on the relative strengths of the substitution and output
effects, and the production technology (Booth, 1995 : 62 - 63).
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4.3 THE IMPACT OF TRADE UNIONS ON PRODUCTIVITY
The orthodo x view of monopoly trade unions is that any monopoly wage gain they secure is at
the expense of one or more parties: non-union workers who may be paid lower wages;
consumers if any increase in costs is passed on as higher prices; or employers (capitalists)
whose profits may be reduced (Booth, 1995 : 183).
Trade uruons may have positive or negative effects in the economy depending upon the
incentives faced and the regulatory environment within which they operate. Opponents of
trade unions see unions as monopolists, limiting employment in order to raise the wages of
members. Alternatively, unions may be viewed as efficiency enhancing in certain situations, in
the sense that the existence of a union may serve to improve the organisation of the work place
and the productivity of the work force (Booth, 1995 : 183).
Two popular views exist in the literature as to how this improved productivity is achieved.
Unionisation may affect the organisation of production and workers' incentives, and hence
both views fall under the broad heading of organisation theories. The first organisation theory
is the so-called "shock" effect, whereby the advent of unionisation, with its associated higher
labour costs, "shock" management into operating the enterprises more efficiently. This view
presumes pre-union inefficiency. According to the monopoly view, firms respond to
unionisation by changing capital (and other inputs) per worker and improving the quality of
labour until the contribution of the last unit of labour just equals the union wage rate.
Although unions may be able to use their monopoly power to lower productivity through
restrictive work practices, competition in the product markets is unlikely to allow such
behaviour to persist for very long (except in markets protected from competition). Figure 4.3
illustrates the effects ofunionisation on productivity.
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Figure 4.3 Unionisation and Productivity
Monopoly Wage
Gains











Source : Freeman and Medoff, 1984 : 163
It is important to note that while the monopoly model predicts higher productivity in unionised
firms than in comparable non-union firms, the monopoly-wage increase in productivity is
socially harmful (Freeman and Medoff, 1984 : 164). The union wage premium distorts factor
prices and causes a misallocation of resources - unionisation induces firms to substitute toward
capital and higher quality labour. In turn, efficiency in consumption will be reduced if the cost
increases are passed on so that the relative prices consumers face fail to reflect social
opportunity costs. The private cost of union labour will exceed its social opportunity costs.
Ultimately, too few workers/goods will be employed/produced in the union sector, and
conversely in the non-union sector (Hirsch and Addison, 1986 : 181).
The first organisational theory follows Leibenstein (1966) in supposing that a firm's output
depends not only on capital and labour inputs, but also on "X-efficiency" which includes such
factors as the firm's motivational structure, managerial supervision, organisational variables
and working conditions. Having to pay higher wages with the advent ofunionisation "shocks"
management into searching for cost savings elsewhere and consequently into more efficient
practices (Booth, 1995 : 183).
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The second organisational theory is the view that the advent of unionisation is associated with
changes in procedural arrangements and improvements in worker morale and co-operation.
Many aspects of labour contracts, and workplace characteristics are collective in native (i.e.
public goods), for example, promotions, grievance procedures and safety provisions, and are
therefore subject to the usual problems associated with preference revelation for public goods.
According to Freeman and Medoff (1984) unions collect information about the preferences of
all workers and enable firms to choose a more efficient mixofwage and personnel policies. In
providing a means of expressing discontent other than through quitting, collective voice, that is
the union, is said to reduce exit behaviour, lower hiring and training costs, and raise firm-
specific investments (Hirsch and Addison, 1986 : 190). Thus, while unions may force up
wages in the union sector, neither employment nor the firm's profitability need necessarily be
greatly affected because higher labour cost may be offset by improved labour productivity.
However, the Freeman and Medoff voice/response view has been criticised as logically
inconsistent, since if unions did raise labour productivity by an amount sufficient to offset the
union mark-up, unit labour costs would fall, and firms should be observed exhibiting an
eagerness for unionisation (Polachek and Siebert, 1993 : 320).
Conversely, unions may be viewed as reducing worker morale and motivation, and obstructing
the efficient organisation of capital and labour through the constraints they impose on
management's choice set. The voice/response analysis identifies the "state of industrial
relations" in a sector as a key factor in either raising or reducing productivity. Unions may
have an adverse effect on productivity through industrial action (strikes), and in some cases the
adoption of an adversarial rather than a co-operative approach to industrial relations.
Therefore, whether the organisational effects of unions enhance or retard productivity is
ultimately an empirical question (Booth, 1995 : 186).
Hirsch and Addison (1986 : 215) surveyed the American literature and concluded that ".. the
longer-term effects of unionism are not encouraging". Booth (1995 : 223) states that "..
unionisation in both Britain and the USA appears, on average, to have a negative impact on
productivity and productivity growth". Consequently without an accompanying productivity
increase, profits will fall as trade unions induce firms to share their surplus (Booth, 1995 :
223). In South Africa wage demands have tended to exceed productivity increases, which has
had the effect of eroding South Africa's international competitiveness. Excessive wage
demands also tend to be inflationary thus impacting negatively on the economy.
60
4.4 THE IMPACT OF TRADE UNIONS ON EMPLOYMENT
The standard model of labour demand indicates that if a union sets a wage rate above the
competitive level, the firm will move up its labour demand curve, cutting back employment to
the point where the new union wage is equal to the (higher) value marginal product of labour
(VMPL). The model predicts that the fall in employment is given by the product of the wage
elasticity of labour demand and the union wage differential (Booth, 1995 : 216). However
this prediction is problematic since if unions achieve sufficient productivity mcreases,
employment may be unaffected. Given a union wage rate of WU and a non-union wage rate
WN, an increase in the value ofthe marginal product oflabour (VMPL) caused by unionisation
will result in a small or even no net impact on employment for the competitive firm despite a
union induced increase in wages (Booth, 1995 : 186). Furthermore, where unionisation of an
imperfectly competitive firm occurs , a higher wage will redistribute some of the firm's
abnormal profits to the workers and need not impact employment (Booth, 1995 : 216).
The potential problems are captured by the following model of labour demand outlined by




n = the labour demanded
w = wage rate
x = exogenous factors affecting labour demand
a and b = constants
Taking the natural logarithms of (5) gives
Inn = alnw + blnx
The labour demand ofa union (n") and a non-union (n") sector will thus be given by
Innu = aUlnwu + bUlnxu
and
















== d) is obtained by subtracting (8) from (7):
d = aU(ln wU_ InwN) + (au _aN) InwN+ bUlnxu - bNlnxN
The union - non-union wage differential is given by (lnwu - Inw
N
). The first term on the
right-hand side of (9) is the product of the wage elasticity of labour demand in the union sector
(au) and the union - non-union wage differential (lnwu - In~). The union - non-union
employment differential will only be given by the product of wage elasticity of labour demand
and the union - non-union differential if all other terms in (9) are equal to zero. Booth notes




Over the 1980s the argument that the institutional structure of wage bargaining may have a
significant effect on macroeconomic performance was proposed (Booth, 1995 : 243). Wage
bargaining structures can be broadly divided into three groups. At the one extreme wage
bargaining is decentralised, taking place at individual firm level. This type of bargaining
occurs in the United States of America, Canada and Switzerland. At the other extreme, wage
bargaining is centralised at the economy level - trade union coalitions and employers'
federations negotiate wage sett lements. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden fall
into this group . The third wage bargaining structure, intermediate bargaining at the industry
level, falls in between these two extremes and characterises bargaining in countries such as the
United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Australia and Belgium (Booth,
1995 : 244).
By the late 1980s, empirical evidence suggested a hump-shaped relationship between the
degree of centralisation of wage bargaining and the maintenance of low unemployment given
aggregate supply shocks (Booth, 1995 : 244). Countries with wage bargaining structures at
the extremes of the spectrum seemed to experience smaller disturbances in unemployment after
major supply shocks.
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The theory underlying the effect of bargaining structure on economic performance follows the
Calmfors and Driffill approach as put forward by Booth (1995 : 245-246). The basis of this
approach is the elasticity of product substitution. Assuming that union utility is a function of
both the real consumption wage, w, = W/P, and employment, unions will know that higher
wages translate into lower employment in the centralised and decentralised cases. The wage-
employment trade-off effectively curbs the power of the unions.
In the decentralised bargaining case, the firm will try to pass the high money wage set by the
union on to the consumer as a higher price for its product. Given that the firm is one of many
in the industry, its product will have many close substitutes. If the firm passes the higher
nominal wage costs onto the consumer, demand for its higher priced product will drop as will
employment. The firm will produce less output and hence its demand for factor inputs
including labour will be reduced. The demand for labour is derived from the demand for the
product and following Marshall, wage elasticity of labour demand is greater the more elastic is
the demand for the firm's product. The union leaders, knowing that a real wage gain can only
be achieved at the cost of greater unemployment, will not press their employer for too high a
money wage increase. Given that the economy consists of many firms, equilibrium aggregate
unemployment will be low. Other reasons may exist for the wage moderation. For example,
where firms impose sanctions on any firm in the industry that agrees to pay too large a wage
increase, employer coordination as opposed to a very elastic product demand may restrict
wage increases.
In the centralised case, all the firms in the economy will pass on as higher product prices any
increase in the nominal wage achieved by the union coalition. Real wages will not rise.
Should the monetary authorities elect to follow a non-accommodation policy, the real money
supply will contract, reducing aggregate demand and leading to an increase in aggregate
unemployment. The union coalition, aware of the trade-off, will set wages consistent with low
equilibrium unemployment.
Booth (1995 : 246) identifies two potential problems with centralised wage bargaining. The
first is wage drift. This is the tendency for certain sectors in strong bargaining positions to
negotiate for themselves wage increases significantly greater than the increase determined
centrally. Hence the ability of the central union coalition to coordinate its constituent unions
and minimize wage drift will affect the wage constraint that a centralised bargaining structure
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can achieve. Second, centralised wage bargaining results in fixed wage relativities across
sectors and may therefore be linked with allocative inefficiencies since fluctuations in relative
wages cannot be used to signal shortages or surpluses of labour in sectors.
In the case of an intermediate-level bargaining structure, and in an economy of many industries,
the nominal wage Wi will be set at the level of the ith industry. Substitutability between
products of different industries will be low, and the industry union will be aware that the high
nominal wage, Wi, can be passed on as higher prices for the product of the ith industry, Pi-
The demand for industry output will not fall too much since industry demand is relatively
inelastic (i.e. no close substitutes). Furthermore, given the many industries in the economy,
the union is of the belief that the consumer price index P will not be affected by the price
increase in the ith industry. Real wages, W i = W;/P, will rise with little effect on
unemployment. If all industry unions follow the same pattern, P will increase, and real wages
will be unaffected, but nominal wages and prices will have increased. Given a fixed nominal
money supply, the real money supply will contract, leading to a fall in aggregate demand and
an increase in aggregate unemployment. However, this will not be taken into account by the
industry union in its wage setting.
Booth (1995), after reviewing the literature, finds that in both Britain and North America there
is some evidence that unions are associated with a negative effect on employment growth.
Neo-liberal analysts consider trade unions ultimately responsible for distortions in the labour
market which give rise to negative economic consequences, including bidding labour costs
above market clearing levels, reducing both competitiveness and employment; establishing
hindrances to flexible adjustment within firms that would increase productivity and reduce
costs; undermining macro-economic stability through excessive (inflationary) wage settlements;
and disturbing industrial peace (Lee, 1998 : 314). As well as these economic efficiency
arguments, there exists an equity-based argument that holds that trade unions increase income
inequality between members and non-members directly through the union wage premium and
indirectly through the adverse impact they have on the employment prospects of non-members
(Lee, 1998 : 314).
However it is argued by some that there is no clear-cut empirical evidence to support the neo-
liberal view that trade unions produce damaging effects. The assertion that more flexibility in
the labour market (i.e. limited involvement by trade unions and thus less union-inspired market
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regulation) is linked to better economic performance is unproven (Lee, 1998 : 315). Neo-
liberals in support of their argument that rigidities in the labour market negatively impact on
employment performance refer to the better employment performance since 1973 ofthe United
States of America (depicting flexible labour markets) compared with that of Europe (seen to
have rigid labour markets). They maintain that unless Europeans want permanent double-digit
unemployment, they need to take steps to achieve greater flexibility in their labour markets.
Nickell (1997) and Nickell and Layard (1999) contend that while labour market features, some
of which could be considered rigidities, do help sustain high levels of unemployment in certain
European countries, there are numerous other so-called rigidities that do not result in high
unemployment. Using data for the period 1983 to 1996, Nickell (1997 : 59) found that
provided a high degree of coordination between unions and employers exists in the wage
bargaining process, high levels of unionisation and union coverage will not have a significant
impact on average levels of unemployment. He states, " .. .unions are bad for jobs, but these
bad effects can be nullified if both the unions and the employers can coordinate their wage
bargaining activities" (1997 : 68).
4.5 SUMMARY
Trade unions have both positive and negative effects. Freedom of association and the right to
organise, which are closely linked to the basic political rights of freedom of expression, of
assembly and from arbitrary arrest, are recognised as fundamental human rights. Such rights
enable workers to mobilise a degree of bargaining power significant enough to curb employer
behaviour that may be arbitrary, exploitative or retaliatory. Workers are able to share in the
economic rents that result from imperfect competition and their involvement in the firm may
boost productivity through improvements in worker morale, co-operation and the operation of
the collective voice. Higher labour costs resulting from union wage demands will thus be
offset by improved labour productivity.
However the negative effects of trade uruons include the obstruction of the efficient
organisation of capital and labour which impinges on management's choice set. Employment is
adversely affected as employers seek to substitute relatively cheaper capital for the more
expensive labour and its attendant hassles. Trade unions also impact on equity in the
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economy. Income inequality between union members and non-members is increased as a result
of the wage premium enjoyed by union members and the consequent negative effect of this
premium on employment in the union sector , which in turn induces "spillover" effects in the
non-union sector. The supply of labour to the non-union sector is increased causing wages in
the non-union sector to be bid down to levels below the prevailing union sector wage and
increasing the level of unemployment in this sector.
The structure of the wage bargaining process is also important. It is argued that in centralised
and decentralised wage bargaining processes trade unions take the effect of their wage
demands on aggregate unemployment into account and set wages that are consistent with low
equilibrium unemployment. This does not occur in the case of an intermediate-level
bargaining structure. The impact of trade unions on aggregate unemployment is thus
dependent on the wage bargaining structure , which is in turn affected by the country 's labour
market legislation.
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5 TRADE UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Although the economic consequences of the apartheid system were all pervasive, the principal
implication for the labour market was severe segmentation, mainly between Africans and the
other races. Black South Africans were effectively excluded from union membership until the
early 1980s. This chapter looks at trade unionism in South Africa and the effects that trade
unions have had on the country's wages. The validity of the segmented labour market and the
labour aristocracy theories in the context of South Africa is then evaluated. A brief overview
ofthe history of South Africa ' s trade union movement is provided in Appendix B.
/
5.2 TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS
Trade unions in South Africa are relatively strong. In 1997, registered unions claimed a
membership of 3,4 million, representing 46 percent of those in formal employment. This rose
to 64 percent when domestic and agricultural workers were excluded (Barker 1999b : 280). In
1998 union membership stood at 3,8 million (an 11 percent increase from the previous year).
This is high by international standards and very high by developing country standards,
particularly given South Africa's high level of unemployment. However, it is argued that union
density may be exaggerated since statistics do rely on union self-reporting, and are based on
employment figures that exclude many unregistered enterprises and employees (which have
low levels of unionisation), and on underestimates of employment (Barker, 1999b : 280).
Nevertheless, evidence does point to trade unions playing and having played an influential and
at times a militant role in the operation of the labour market.
The threat ofa strike is the primary means by which unions are able to acquire power and is
only credible iffirms cannot immediately replace the workforce . It is therefore in the union's
interest to achieve a monopoly over the supply oflabour by organising all or the majority of the
workers in the industry. Table 5.1 shows the cumulative number of man-days lost in South
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Africa over the last decade due to strike action. It is clear from these figures that South
African trade unions are prepared to exert their right to strike to achieve their objectives.
Table 5.1 Cumulative Number Of Man-Days Lost Due To Strike Action (In MiUions)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
4,0 3,8 4,2 3,6 3,9 1,6 1,7 0,65 2,3 3,1
Source: Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 19
Andrew Levy & Associates (2000 : 19) note that most of the strike action in 1999 was high
profile in nature, wage related, and highly emotional. Wages remained the major strike trigger,
accounting for 97,2 percent of the total number of man-days lost or 80 percent of the number
of strikes. The increase in strike activity can be attributed to employers who were moved by
the weakening economy and the impacts of globalisation to assume a tougher position during
wage negotiations, and on the country 's second democratic election, which created a degree of
instability in the bargaining environment (Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 19).
Over the long-term union membership is expected to stagnate or even decline for the following
reasons (Barker, 1999b : 283):
1) Over the last decade a significant drop in trade union membership has occurred across the
world. Although membership growth in South Africa was the highest of the 92 countries
surveyed by the International Labour Organisation in 1997, there are concerns about the future
of trade unionism in South Africa. Sectors that traditionally have had a high union density are
experiencing a decline in membership. Union membership in manufacturing has fallen and
employment in mining, the sector with the highest union density, will probably continue to fall
as the industry restructures and rationalises. Furthermore , future downscaling, outsourcing
and privatisation could negatively impact the growth ofunions in the public sector.
2) The labour force has been experiencing structural changes. A long-term trend away from
unskilled, manual jobs to higher skilled, white-collar and service jobs, which have lower levels
of unionisation, has been observed and this may negatively impact union membership. Most
trade unions in South Africa are craft or industry unions and since workers are increasingly
changing sectors and occupational categories , support for these types of unions will be
weakened.
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3) Employers, in attempting to keep their labour costs down, may try to bypass the unions.
South Africa's accelerated integration into the global economy has meant that capital has
become increasingly mobile. Labour costs now playa critical role in businesses' achieving
competitive status and maintaining this position.
4) The growing popularity of employing atypical workers (temporary, part-time and contract
workers) and outsourcing will affect unions as such workers are less likely to join unions. The
growth of the informal sector and other small enterprises will also affect union density since
these traditionally have low union membership.
5) Andrew Levy & Associates, consultants in the labour relations field, hypothesise that the
influence and power unions possess will fall" and that this with other mega trends such as the
application of technology, and the outsourcing revolution, will lead to a rethink, a restructuring
and a re-definition of the conduct ofemployment relations" (2000 : 50).
Currently there are three major union federations in South Africa, namely:
1) The Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)
2) The National Council ofTrade Unions (Nactu)
3) The Federation of Unions of South Africa (Fedusa)
These three federations form the labour constituency at the National Economic Development
and Labour Council (NEDLAC). NEDLAC was established in 1995 as a means of facilitating
cooperation and seeking agreement between organised business, organised labour, a
development constituency and government on issues of economic, labour and development
policy. In 1999, Cosatu held four seats and Nactu and Fedusa one each; government, labour
and business hold six seats each at NEDLAC.
1) Cosatu
Cosatu was founded in 1985 and has since more than trebled its membership. It currently has
a claimed membership of approximately 1,8 million and is the country 's largest and most
powerful union federation with 17 affiliates as of 1999. The federation was founded on
principles of non-racialism and non-sexism; one industry, one union; worker control of the
union; paid-up membership; one country, one federation and international worker solidarity
(Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 12 - 13). It is committed to a socialist economic system.
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Cosatu adopted the Freedom Charter and is in a formal alliance with the African National
Congress (ANC) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). However, Cosatu
continues to confront the government on issues it feels strongly about (for example, its
opposition to the government's macroeconomic policy, Growth, Employment And
Redistribution (GEAR) ).
Current growth is taking place in the public sector unions while unions in the private sector
have been losing members due to ongoing retrenchments and rationalisation. The mining
industry has been particularly affected . The continuing decline in formal sector job levels is
expected to reduce its overall membership, ultimately affecting Cosatu's overall influence and
effectiveness. To counteract this Cosatu is looking to organize the growing informal sector
with the two-fold purpose of bringing these workers under the protection of the Labour
Relations Act and increasing its membership (Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 12 -13).
2) Nactu
Nactu, formerly a black consciousness movement with an Africanist leadership stance, now
supports leadership by the working class. As of 1999 it had 19 affiliates and an estimated
membership of 300 000 (Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 14). The federation believes in
non-affiliation to political parties; otherwise philosophies and principles correspond to those of
Cosatu.
3) Fedusa
Fedusa was formed in 1997 when the Federation of South African Labour Unions (Fedsal)
amalgamated with the Federation of Organisations Representing Civil Employees (Force) and
it is the second largest trade union federation. Initially it had a predominantly white
membership base representing skilled workers; now it has a majority of black members. As of
1999 membership stood at approximately 555 000 covering 27 affiliates (Andrew Levy &
Associates, 2000 : 16).
FEDUSA has a policy of not aligning itself politically and it expresses support for "balanced"
economic policies. It is founded on principles of equal opportunities and non-discrimination,
professionalism and disciplined action (Andrew Levy & Associates, 2000 : 16).
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5.3 WAGES AND TRADE UNIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
The Second World War resulted in a labour shortage in South African cities. Urbanisation of
Africans increased as the jobs vacated by white soldiers were filled by people of other races
(Hofmeyer, 1998 : 3). However, demobilisation at the end of the Second World War and the
defeat of the Smuts government in 1948, saw a substantial number of Africans lose their jobs.
A surplus of labour developed and the real wage levels for Africans in the modem sector
stagnated after having rapidly risen during the war (Hofmeyer, 1996 : 234). White wages
continued to rise over this period partly as a result of apartheid policies that protected the
white monopoly on skilledjobs. However the economy grew at a pace substantially faster than
the population and by 1960 a shortage of skilled labour had developed causing the Nationalist
government of the time to adjust its policies on immigration. Although the flow of skilled
immigrants increased, the shortages continued to the extent that employers started to resist the
law by training and promoting black workers to fill more skilled positions. The government
finally accepted the need for a more skilled black worker and began to rapidly expand
education from the early 1970s (Hofmeyer, 1996 : 234).
In the late 1960s shortages of unskilled labour (at least as far as males were concerned) had
also arisen in wide areas of the country. Despite the presence of influx control and a policy
discouraging the urbanisation of Africans, farmers had to approximately double real wages
between the late 1960s and the late 1970s in order to attract and keep their workers
(Hofmeyer, 1996 : 234).
An internationally fixed gold price meant that the mining industry had to keep costs in check.
African wages were thus held at levels much lower than other industrial employees. This was
made possible by the mining industry's access to foreign labour that was willing to accept
lower wages than local labour because of greater poverty and a dearth of income-earning
alternatives in their home countries. However the low wages paid during the 1960s made it
increasingly difficult for the mining industry to attract South African labour. Hence it became
clear that the continuation of this low wage policy would result in the mining industry's
complete dependence on foreign labour. The increase in the gold price from the early 1970s
combined with the political risks inherent in a dependence on foreign labour as emphasised by
Malawi's withdrawal of labour following the crash of an aeroplane carrying migrant workers,
and the coming into power of the hostile Frelimo government in Mozambique, caused the
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mines to revise their policy. (Hofineyer, 1996 : 235) The decision was made to increase the
proportion of local Africans, and to achieve this, a more competitive wage had to be paid.
Thus average wages trebled in real terms and the proportion oflocal African workers increased
from 25 percent to over 60 percent between 1971 and 1977. (Hofineyer, 1996 : 235)
Improvements in the conditions of employment in the urban areas resulted in labour shortages
in the rural areas thereby forcing traditionally low wage employers to raise wages substantially
in order to compete (Hofineyer, 1996 : 235). However, after 1975 economic growth and
employment growth collapsed with only a brief recovery at the end of the 1970s.
The Wiehahn Commission, appointed by the government to examine all aspects of labour
relations, presented its first report in 1979 in which it recommended that Africans be given full
trade union rights, and that existing trade unions be recognised and fully incorporated into the
official industrial relations system. The government elected to adopt the recommendations in
stages and by 1984 all restrictions had been removed. Thus with the recognition of full trade
union rights for black workers, legislated apartheid in the labour market largely disappeared
(Hofineyer, 1996 : 235).
The relationship between unemployment and the wage changes that occurred in the post-war
period can be divided into three phases. The first phase is characterised by a developing
scarcity of African labour, even at the unskilled level for prime-age males. The labour market
conditions were thus a cause and not a consequence of the increases in overall real wages. The
wage increases enjoyed by African workers could be viewed as one of the natural
consequences of economic growth, and thus would have no adverse effects on employment.
Any mechanisation that took place because of the rising relative price of labour would have
been entirely appropriate, since the rising price correctly indicated an increasing scarcity of
labour (Hofineyer, 1996 : 238).
The second phase began in the mid-1970s when the economy entered a severe recession.
Pressure for higher wages dissipated and wage rates for large sections of the labour force,
especially the less skilled, fell. Hofineyer ( 1996 : 236) found that most occupational wage
rates for males decreased in real terms between 1975 and 1985, particularly for the least
skilled, and that occupational differentials increased. Unemployment and underemployment
grew as labour supply exceeded demand. The development of a labour surplus is confirmed by
the stagnation of agricultural and domestic wages after the mid-1970s, and the growing gap
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between them and industrial wages (Hofineyer, 1998: 5). He notes that this growth in
unemployment seemed to have been more a cause than a consequence of the wage changes.
Unemployment rose as population growth outpaced the growth in overall modem sector prime
employment.
The third phase began in the early 1980s when wage rates started to increase for large parts of
the labour force. However, the increases seemed to be in inverse proportion to the level of
skill. After 1985, occupational wage rates in the manufacturing sector began to rise but rising
most for the least skilled (Hofineyer, 1996 : 237). In the early eighties the mining sector also
saw wage rates for unskilled Africans rising more rapidly than those of the skilled. The
growing unionisation of African workers is identified as the most probable underlying cause of
such wage movements since a narrowing of the skilled-unskilled wage gap is an important
objective of trade unions. It thus appears that institutional factors played a more important
role than market forces in sectors where such wage patterns were evident (Hofineyer, 1996 :
237). The gap between industrial wages and agricultural and domestic wages continued
growing which, as noted, is an indication of the absence of any labour shortage which would
drive wages up (Hofineyer, 1996 : 237). A study conducted by Moll (1993) showed that by
1985 black unions in South Africa had made wage gains similar to those made by unions in
developed countries. The union wage effect for black male and female blue-collar workers in
1985 was about 24%, which is within the range of effects found in studies of unions in the
United States of America but above those found for the European unions. As is typical of
union action in developing countries, the black unions tended to reduce wage differentials
across skill levels, raising the minimum wages for the unskilled. Employment actually started
to decline after 1989. The net decline over the period 1985 to 1993 was 148 000 persons, or
0,2 percent per year (Barker, 1999 : 81). However in spite of growing unemployment real
wages continued to rise as wage increases were consistently negotiated above levels of
inflation.
The relationship that exists between union-driven wage increases and unemployment is
complex. One cannot simply conclude that these union-driven wage increases directly caused
the unemployment. However union pressure would have indirectly exacerbated any existing
unemployment problem (Hofineyer, 1996 : 239). Significant wage differences between similar
jobs in different sectors and regions are a consequence of unionisation. Unionisation will
therefore lead to an increasingly fragmented labour market.
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5.3.1 LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION
The segmented labour market theory was developed to explain certain phenomena, such as the
existence of large variations in the individual earnings of workers that differences in education
and training levels could not satisfactorily account for. Segmentation involves the
compartmentalisation of a market into non-competing segments. Each segment has its own
characteristics, method of operation and little ifno mobility takes place between them (Barker,
1999 : 24). Apartheid induced labour legislation prevented competition between races,
between urban and rural Africans, and between Africans in different urban areas. The skilled
jobs were reserved for the Whites while the Africans were restricted to employment in the
unskilled sectors in the industrial and commercial centres and the Coloureds and Indians fell
somewhere in between. In addition, Africans could not move freely between urban and rural
areas, or between urban areas (Hofineyer, 1998 : 6). The South African labour market was
thus initially segmented along racial lines, but it is now argued that labour market is
increasingly taking the form ofa dual labour market.
A dual labour market is a special case of the segmented labour market and comprises two non-
competing markets, namely the primary and the secondary labour markets. The primary sector
consists of those in formal sector employment in large enterprises or under regulated
conditions. In addition, employment in the formal sector is likely to be further segmented
between those who have unionised jobs and those who do not. Employees in the primary
market enjoy high earnings, good working conditions, upward mobility and stable employment
(Barker, 1999 : 24). The secondary market is characterised by low paying low-skill jobs,
limited upward mobility, unstable employment and low levels of unionisation. The secondary
market includes the informal sector and firms that are typically over-competitive , small-scale
and labour intensive (Barker, 1999 : 25). The feature distinguishing the primary and
secondary markets is the extent to which the conditions in that segment are determined by
market forces. The connection is very loose in the primary market and much more direct in the
secondary labour market (Hofineyer, 1996 : 240). Wage levels in the primary sector are
determined under union pressure and by taking seniority, career scales etc. into consideration
and tend to be significantly higher than the market-determined or market-clearing levels. This
is particularly true if working conditions, job security and promotional prospects are included
(Hofineyer, 1996 : 240). Wages (or earnings in self-employment) in the secondary sector are
generally close to market-clearing levels. Individuals employed in the primary sector become
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part of the privileged elite or ' insiders' while those employed in the secondary sector are
'outsiders' . Jobs in the primary sector are thus in demand. Although an oversimplification,
Hofmeyer (1996 : 240) holds that this model captures the essential aspects of the South
African situation.
Unions can exacerbate segmentation and Hofmeyer (1996 : 240 - 241) illustrates this using the
example of the one-off costs associated with the hiring and firing of labour. The existence of
these costs is one cause of segmentation. To reduce such costs, firms will attempt to minimise
labour turnover and create long-term employment relationships. If employees share this cost
by, for example, accepting a lower wage during training, they will also prefer a long-lasting
employment relationship. Effectively both employer and employees undertake an investment
the returns of which will be increased by ensuring that the employment relationship lasts as
long as possible. A bilateral monopoly is created to a degree thereby allowing bargaining over
the size of the return received by each party. Unions can use this power to extract the
maximum possible wage and thus maximise the wage differences that characterise the
segmentation of the labour market (Hofmeyer, 1996 : 241). These wages may lead to
additional mechanisation. As mechanisation takes place employment will contract or expand at
a slower rate than would otherwise be the case, forcing a larger proportion of the labour force
to enter the secondary labour market, depressing earnings in this sector and further
exacerbating segmentation (Hofmeyer, 1996 : 241).
5.3.2 THE LABOUR ARISTOCRACY THEORY
The idea of a labour aristocracy was developed in the late-nineteenth century by Socialists in an
attempt to explain workers' failure to rise against capital. They argued that a section of the
working class had abandoned their revolutionary destiny - the artisans due to their skills were
interested in maintaining the status quo. Hostile to the changes sought by the working mass,
the artisans behaved like the old aristocracy, undermining efforts at a revolutionary
reconstitution of society (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 166). This "new" labour aristocracy
was seen as benefiting directly from, or co-conspiring in, the capitalist exploitation.
The development of nationalist independence movements at the end of the colonial era saw the
labour aristocracy theory redeployed to explain the gap between the small and seemingly
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privileged urban wage force and the mass of poor peasants, and the inability of the former to
lead a progressive movement in the interests of the latter. For this reason African Marxists
preferred national liberation led by the peasants (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996: 167).
In the 1960s and 1970s liberal analysts adopted the view that projects aimed at national
development constituted a type of class domination in which the urban elite - owners and
workers - created policies that intentionally favoured the cities and manufacturing at the
expense of agriculture (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 167). This neo-liberal formulation of the
labour aristocracy thesis became very influential with the onset of the debt crisis in the 1980s.
The World Bank and the neo-liberal analysts held that the urban elite played a central role in
the debt-based development projects that were blamed for the crisis. Structural Adjustment
Programmes (SAPs) consisting of budget cuts, privatisation, currency devaluation and price
and tariff liberalisation, inter alia, were introduced to reverse policies that favoured the urban
elite (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 167).
The use of the labour aristocracy thesis in Africa in both its Marxist and neo-liberal form has
been criticised. Adler and O'Sullivan (1996 : 168) argue that the real income levels of urban
workers and the extent of the difference between African workers and peasants (urban and
rural workers) are exaggerated, while the more significant inconsistencies between property
and non-property owners are ignored. They claim that the division of the labour force into
urban insiders and rural outsiders disregards the interdependence and support available
between urban and rural life. The second criticism of the thesis is its failure to correctly
interpret the political orientation of African workers who are much more likely to oppose
rather than act in agreement with the elite group (Adesina, 1992 cited in Adler and O'Sullivan,
1996 : 168). Despite these criticisms the labour aristocracy thesis continues to form part of
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) orthodo xy. After 1990 the renewed
involvement of the World Bank and the IMF in South African development policy debates led
to the revival of the labour aristocracy thesis in the country (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996: 168).
In the past in South Africa, Marxists and neo-Marxists referred to the labour aristocracy thesis
to explain the characteristics associated with a labour market distorted along racial lines, and
the high wages, good living conditions and the political behaviour of white workers (Adler and
O'Sullivan, 1996 : 169). Current supporters of the labour aristocracy thesis grant less
attention to the political and racial aspects, emphasising instead organisational factors in the
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labour market that place unionised formal sector workers in positions of unfair advantage
(Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 169).
Following the general neo-liberal view, the strong trade unions in South Africa drive the price
of labour up beyond workers' contributions to productivity improvements and the current
supply of labour. The high relative cost of labour encourages mechanisation as opposed to
labour-absorbing production processes which would be more appropriate for an economy with
a labour surplus. Industry thus becomes too capital intensive and investment is drawn away
from other important areas. Growth provides high incomes for union members while little
occurs to reduce unemployment (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 169). Unions are blamed for
the gap between the high wage sector, and low-wage earners and the unemployed because of
the emphasis they place on increases based on a living wage for their members (as opposed to
productivity-linked increases), and it is argued that the centralised bargaining favoured by
unions, leads to wage gains throughout the economy, even where firms are not in a position to
pay and where workers are not particularly productive (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 169).
In South Africa the labour aristocracy thesis has thus come to characterise the differences
between unionised workers and non-unionised workers, informal sector workers , the
unemployed and rural people (Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 170). Union members in the
formal sector are seen as a rent-seeking special interest group whose behaviour benefits union
members at the expense of job creation, non-members and the unemployed. The solutions
suggested by the neo-liberals vary but the common points are deregulation of the labour
market and the weakening of the unions' ability to achieve generalised wage gains through
collective bargaining. Adler and O'Sullivan (1996 : 170) believe that this would involve
restricting bargaining councils' abilities to extend wage and working condition agreements to
non-part ies, developing a second deregulated tier in the formal labour market, and/or creating
incentives for the development of the informal sector.
The labour aristocracy thesis is based on the assertion that union members experience a
considerably better standard of living (measured in terms of income) than non-union workers
and the unemployed. A tyrannical relationship is held to exist between these two groups with
unionised workers benefiting at the expense of non-union members. However Adler and
O'Sullivan (1996) showed using data from the Central Statistical Service' s 1994 October
Household Survey, that South African unionised workers do not enjoy a substantially improved
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standard of living compared to their non-unionised counterparts. They found that although
African workers benefited from union membership, enjoying income levels higher than non-
unionised workers with similar education levels, the differences were not statistically
significant. Furthermore, the gap between unionised African workers and non-unionised
African workers is smaller than that which exists between all African workers whether
unionised or not, whether well educated or not, and white workers with very limited education
(Adler and O'Sullivan, 1996 : 178). The aristocracy revealed by their data is one based on race
or education.
5.4 SUMMARY
Trade unions playa major role in the South African labour market as evidenced by the high
levels of trade union membership particularly in the formal non-agricultural sector . The South
African labour market is characterised by elements of both the labour market segmentation and
labour aristocracy theories in that the unionised sector of the labour force has successfully used
its bargaining power derived largely from the threat to strike, to achieve wage increases in
excess of contributions to greater productivity and the wage increases enjoyed by non-
unionised workers. The extension of bargaining council wage and conditions of employment
agreements to include non-party employers and employees within the jurisdiction of the council
has further served to standardise these high wages and worker-friendly conditions of
employment across sectors. High relative labour costs have encouraged the replacement of
labour by capital increasing unemployment and discouraging job creation in the formal sector
of the economy.
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6 GLOBALISATION AND TRADE LIBERALISATION
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The establishment of a democracy in 1994 brought an end to South Africa's apartheid-related
isolation. Globalisation, that is " ... the accelerated integration of economies throughout the
world through trade , financial flows, the exchange of technology, information and ideas, and
the movement of people" (Calitz 2000 : 1), is thus a fairly recent challenge for the country.
Globalisation " .. . is driven by :firm strategies to exploit competitive advantages internationally,
use favourable local inputs and infrastructure, and locate in final markets" (OECD, 1994 : 26).
Therefore a consequence of globalisation is business' preference of certain countries based on
their assessment of the country's ability to satisfy their requirements and to provide a
hospitable and supportive environment. The ability of a country to grow and create
opportunities will thus depend to a large degree on whether or not the assessment of its
business environment is favourable . The factors that influence a country' s attractiveness as a
location for business comprise labour legislation, the extent of trade unionisation , the
educational and skills profile of the labour force, and the presence of infrastructural
prerequisites, including social stability and predictable and honest government (Andrew Levy
& Associates, 2000 : 52).
South Africa 's potential for economic growth is affected by internat ional conditions, the most
influential being the terms and availability of international investment and the growth in exports
(Sellars, 2000 : 487) . Calitz (1997 : 323) notes, "The welfare benefits to be derived from
[globalisation] are strongly correlated with the extent to which effect is given to the principles,
policies and practices which ensure that the growth in the world economy benefits the South
African economy maximally via foreign trade and investment".
This chapter considers the effects of globalisation on labour markets, and the impact that
globalisation has on a count ry's comparative advantage . The chapter then looks at trade
liberalisation in South Africa and the impact that this has had and is having on the labour
market in the context of increasing integration in the global economy.
79
6.2 GLOBALISATION AND THE LABOUR MARKET
Increasing globalisation has meant that capital is no longer a fixed factor of production, rather
it moves around the world, taking advantage of profitable investment opportunities. Labour,
on the other hand, is less mobile and hence labour costs play an increasingly determinant role in
a country's comparative advantage (Nattrass, 1998 : 72- 73). As trade barriers and transport
costs fall, firms in developed countries, who pay wages inconsistent with productivity, will be
out-competed by lower-wage developing countries. Low product ivity sectors will end up
situated in low-wage developing countries , and the more skill-intensive sectors will be situated
in developed countries where higher wages are accompanied by higher productivity (Nattrass,
1998 : 72-73). This will affect labour markets. As cheaper, less-skill-intensive imports enter a
country, the wages of workers in the import-competing sector of the economy will fall or the
import-competing part of the industry will go out of business. In the latter case, the displaced
workers will enter other sectors , bringing down wages for all the unskilled, or if they are
unable to find alternative employment, they will enter the pool of unskilled unemployed. On
the other hand, the movement of capital into skill-intensive sectors and the upgrading of
technologies by existing enterprises as they implement 'defensive innovation' will cause the
wages of skilled workers to rise (Nattrass, 1998 : 73). Economic theory thus predicts that a
decrease in the demand for unskilled labour will lead to a fall in the equilibrium real wage and a
reduction in unskilled manufacturing employment, particularly where labour market regulation
provides a wage floor (Nattrass , 1998 : 74).
This theory is supported by trends in advanced capitalist countries. The growth of low-skill-
intensive manufactured imports from developing countries was followed by a fall in demand for
less-skilled workers and an increase in manufacturing productivity (Nattrass, 1998 : 73).
Given data deficiencies and disputes over methodology, the exact effect that international trade
has on developed country labour markets cannot be determined. However, there is consensus
that international trade does have some effect. Wood (1997 : 33) states that " . .. the debate
over trade and inequality in developed countries is now over the magnitude of the effects, with
their direction - adverse to unskilled workers - being largely agreed".
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6.3 TRADE LIBERALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
At the beginning of the 1900s agriculture and the newly emerging mining industry formed the
basis of the South African economy. Jones and Muller (1992 : 15) note , "In 1910 the mines
were the source of capital , the engine of growth and the lubricating oil that made the whole
system work smoothly", In 1898 South Africa had become the largest gold producer in the
world and has remained such ever since (with only one small exception during World War I).
This emergence of a powerful mining industry facilitated South Africa's transformation from a
poor agricultural economy into Africa 's industrial leader and an important force among the
world's emerging markets (Innes, 1999 : 9).
During the early 1900s the manufacturing industry was virtually non-existent and most of the
country's manufactured goods were imported, largely from Britain. The First World War
disrupted the production of civilian manufactures in England and Europe, providing an
important boost for South Africa's manufacturing industries.
In 1922, political leaders started to take the development of the country's econorruc
infrastructure seriously. The Smuts government established the Electricity Supply Commission
(Escom) in 1922 and the Pact government (a National Party and Labour Party alliance which
had come to power in 1924), formed the South African Iron and Steel Corporation (Iscor) in
1928. The Pact government felt it important that South Africa become economically
independent and in 1925, a policy of import-substituting industrialization was adopted. This
was implemented by means of import controls and the establishment of parastatals in key
industries. Rapid industrial growth and diversification resulted initially. However, the
import substitutes produced primarily met the demand from the narrow middle- and upper-
income group and hence the potential for long-run growth was constrained. South Africa was
thus in a position to take advantage of the growth opportunities provided by the outbreak of
the Second World War in 1939 (Innes , 1999: 12).
In the post-war period, world trade normalised and South African industries were open to
foreign competition. However, the Sharpeville riot in 1960 initiated a sudden and sharp capital
outflow leading to the introduction of foreign exchange controls and the decision to leave the
Commonwealth by the National Party. Import controls and tariff barriers were extended with
the aim of establishing a protected environment in which South Africa's industries could grow.
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At this time the Free State gold fields produced huge revenues and due to the foreign exchange
controls, the mining houses had little choice but to invest a large part of their revenue in South
Africa's manufacturing and financial industries . Over the period 1961 to 1972 South Africa
experienced an economic boom with economic growth rates averaging 5,3% per annum
(Barker, 1999b : 80) . However the small size of the domestic market, the foreign exchange
controls, the dead weight of state regulation and controls, the inefficiency of many state
enterprises, the negative effect of poor education and skills development on productivity, and
the political instability following the Soweto uprising in 1976, all made South African industry
less efficient and the investment environment more risky (Innes , 1999 : 12).
By the 1970s the limitations of an import-substituting industrialization policy were becoming
evident . The protection of import-substituting industries had created an anti-export bias in the
manufacturing sector. This led to a shift in the emphasis of the country's trade policy to
export promotion and the adoption of export incentives, although they were initially limited in
scope and largely unsuccessful. The export drive culminated in 1990 with the introduction of
the General Export Incentive Scheme (GElS). GElS applied mainly to industrial or processed
products and producers qualified for a tax-free subsidy of a percentage of the Rand value of
their exports with the percentage depending on the degree of processing and local content
(ILO , 1999 : paragraph 7 - 11). GElS promoted natural-resource-intensive manufacturing
exports relatively successfully. Labour-intensive sectors on the other hand, took less
advantage of the scheme (Belli, Finger and Ballevan, 1993 and Jenkins , Bleaney and Holden,
1995 cited in ILO, 1999 : paragraph 11 ). After the 1985 foreign debt crisis, South Africa
began to exhibit the typical developing country pattern, tending towards a debt trap,
accompanied by falling raw material prices and capital outflows (Barker, 1999b : 81) . The
average economic growth rate for the period 1985 to 1993 was a mere 0,6% per annum - a
consequence of political uncertainty, disinvestment and sanctions experienced in the country
(Barker, 1999b : 81) .
The year 1994 saw the birth of democracy in South Africa and while the new government has
made progress in opening South Africa's economy to global trends, the results of 40 years of
protectionism could not be instantaneously reversed. Economic growth continued to be
disappointing. Although growth in real gross domestic product picked up in 1995 and 1996
growing at 3,1% and 4,2% respectively, it fell thereafter recovering to 3,1% in 2000.
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In the environment of globalisation, macroeconomic stability forms the platform for economic
liberalisation. South Africa has, in line with the international trend, expanded the importance
awarded to a macroeconomic stabilization policy to include structural reform or development
of the economy (Calitz, 1997 : 323). Macroeconomic stability is considered a necessary
condition for sustained economic growth, which in turn is considered a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for income redistribution and poverty alleviation in developing countries
(Calitz, 2000 : 3).
South Africa has pursued a gradualist approach to economic reform following largely (with the
exception of the labour legislation and certain tax measures) the ideal policy sequence of
reform that has come to be known as the Washington Consensus. Such a reform process
involves, in chronological order, as outlined by Weiss (1995, cited in Calitz 2000 : 6):
a) Macroeconomic stabilisation - particularly in terms of expenditure restriction and exchange
rate adjustment.
b) Reform of domestic commodity and labour markets - removing price and wage controls
and phasing out subsidies.
c) Tax reform - broadening the tax base and rationalising many taxes.
d) Trade reform - removrng quotas and reducing tariffs plus further exchange rate
adjustment.
e) Domestic financial liberalisation - removing or raising interest rate ceilings and relaxing
restrictions on commercial bank activity.
f) External financialliberalisation - removing controls on capital inflows and outflows.
A trade liberalisation program was initiated and an agreement with the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) was signed in January 1994. This agreement involved reducing the
general level of tariff protection from a weighted average of 30 to 15 percent over a 5 year
period, rationalising the tariff structure and replacing import quotas with tariff measures in
respect of agricultural imports (Calitz, 2000 : 5). In 1994, the decision was taken to phase out
GElS since such a scheme is not allowed under the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs
and World Trade Organisation rules, and by mid-1997, the programme had been terminated
entirely. Liberalising trade is a significant structural change, the benefits of which can be
expected once the anti-export bias created by the previous import-substitution policy has been
removed and ". .. the country enters a path of higher, export-led growth benefiting from the
dynamic gains from foreign trade" (Coetzee, Gwarada, Naude and Swanepoel, 1997 : 165).
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The government also implemented a process of external and domestic financial liberalisation
and adopted a conservative fiscal and monetary stance.
The export-oriented industrialization policies adopted in Latin America and South Africa in the
1980s and 1990s did not achieve the eminent success of similar policies adopted earlier by East
Asian countries. Conventional wisdom holds that as developing countries adopt more
outward-o riented policies (i.e. become more open to trade) efficiency will increase and wage
inequality will fall. This argument is based on the fact that the relative supply of unskilled
labour to skilled labour is greater in developing than in developed countries, and on the
Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade which asserts that countries export goods that use relatively
abundant factors of production intensively and import goods that use relatively scarce factors
intensively (Wood, 1997 : 34). Given the abundance of unskilled workers in developing
countries, increased trade will push the relative demand for unskilled workers upwards,
reducing the gap between unskilled and skilled workers' wages and unemployment rates
(Wood, 1997 : 34).
The experience of East Asian countries in the 1960s and 1970s supports the conventional
wisdom but that of Latin America and South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s does not
(Wood, 1997 : 42 - 46). One explanation lies in the differences between East Asia, and Latin
America and South Africa. The other, and considered by Wood (1997 : 55) as the more
likely explanation for the reasons mentioned below, is that the international environment faced
by Latin America and South Africa differed greatly from that encountered by the Asian tigers
when they entered the international market and adopted export-oriented industrialisation
policies. Firstly, the volume of international trade as a proportion of total output has greatly
increased (Nattrass, 1998 : 72). Secondly, low-income countries such as Bangladesh, China,
India, Indonesia and Pakistan, which were closed to trade in the 1960s and 1970s, now
dominate low-wage, labour-intensive (and relatively unskilled) export production (Nattrass,
1998 : 72). Indonesia and China lead the move and by the mid-1980s all five countries were
opening to trade. Half the world's population and an even greater proportion of the world' s
unskilled workers live in these five countries. During the period 1987 to 1993, manufactures
imported by developed countries from these countries nearly quadrupled from $28 billion to
$110 billion (about one-third of all manufactured imports from developing countries) while
developed countries' imports from middle-income countries increased by less than 50 percent
(Wood, 1997 : 48 -49).
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Wood (1997 : 49) notes that the opening to trade of these low-income countries is likely to
have changed the comparative advantage of middle-income countries which have intermediate
ratios of skilled to unskilled labour, that is, above the global average but below that of
developed countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, developed and middle-income countries
effectively made up the economic world, and hence the comparative advantage in low-skill-
intensive goods fell to the middle-income countries. In the 1980s, low-income Asia began to
establish its own comparative advantage in low-skill-intensive goods. This shifted the
comparative advantage of middle- income countries to goods of intermediate skill intensity
(Wood, 1997 : 49). The East Asian economies that had opened to trade in the 1960s (Hong
Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) experienced rapid skills growth,
facilitating a shift in their comparative advantage towards goods of intermediate skill intensity
(Wood, 1997 : 49).
He concludes that it is likely that the effect on relative wages in a middle-income country as it
opens to trade has changed over time. In the 1960s, greater openness would have increased
the relative wage of unskilled workers, since given a comparative advantage in goods of low
skill intensity, sectors of above-average and below-average skill intensity would have shrunk
and expanded respectively. However, opening to trade in the 1980s resulted in discrepancies
in the effects on relative wages. Contraction occurred in sectors of both high skill intensity
(replaced by imports from developed countries) and low skill intensity (replaced by imports
from low-income countries). The overall effect could be in either direction. The middle-
income countries of Latin America experienced a widening of the gap between skilled and
unskilled workers in this period (Wood, 1997 : 49).
The argument that globalisation results in net job losses has the support of Cosatu workers
despite assurances from the Minister of Trade and Industry, Alec Erwin, that export expansion
will create more jobs than will be lost through greater import penetration (Nattrass, 1998 : 79).
Bhorat and Hodge (1999 : 378) found that domestic firms responded to trade liberalization by
increasing their capital-labour ratios "in a bid to remain competitive through higher
productivity and more efficient methods of production". They conclude that the structure of
labour demand in firms today is characterized by a rising demand for skilled and semi-skilled
wo~kers and the rationalization of workers "at the bottom-end of the occupational ladder".
Bell and Cattaneo (cited by Nattrass ,1998 : 79) found that between 1985 and 1993
employment in manufacturing fell, but employment associated with manufactured exports
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increased by 3,1 percent per annum. However, the fall in the labour intensity of manufactured
exports relative to that of imports and the manufacturing sector as a whole elicits concern.
Bell and Cattaneo (1997) calculated that a shift in the sectoral composition of exports
accounted for 36 percent of the decline in average labour intensity. They also noted sectoral
shifts away from relatively black labour-intensive industries and towards white labour-intensive
industries, which, to the extent that race is a proxy for skill, indicates that exports have become
more skill intensive. Nattrass (1998 : 80) draws on Tsikata (1998) for confirmation of this
trend, ".. South Africa has a "paradoxical" export structure with a remarkably low and
declining share of exports that use unskilled labour, and a relatively high share that use more
skilled labour." Tsikata (1998) identifies comparatively high wage levels (relative to
productivity), which place South Africa at a competitive disadvantage in low-wage, unskilled-
labour-intensive activities, as a cause of this trend.
Hayter (cited in Sellars, 2000 : 493), in a study of more recent data, found that while capital-
intensive products made up 51 percent of exports in 1993, rising to 52 percent in 1997, labour-
intensive products fell from 49 percent of imports in 1993 to 48 percent in 1997. Both Hayter
(1998) and Edwards (2000, cited in Sellars, 2000 : 493) found that over the 1993 - 1997
period employment in the capital-intensive manufacturing sectors fell by more than in the
labour-intensive sectors. Studies by Bhorat (1999) and Edwards (2000) and cited by Sellars
(2000 : 493) show that the fall in employment occurred among the unskilled, the fall being
attributed by the authors to tariff liberalization and technological change respectively.
The increase in the demand for skilled labour in the export sector is troubling, particularly in
light of the negative impact skilled labour shortages have on economic growth. Furthermore
ultra-labour-intensive imports, such as clothing, wood and wood products, from low wage
countries are rising whereas South African exports in these categories are falling (Nattrass,
1998 : 84). The fall in the demand for unskilled labour, at least in the export sector, is not
encouraging with regards to the ability of the economy to provide jobs for the unskilled
unemployed. Furthermore, the current labour market legislation characterised by rigidity is
likely to bring about job losses as opposed to a considerable fall in wages, particularly in the
import-competing sectors.
Sellars (2000 : 495) concludes that, " .. .international competitive forces appear to be the
decisive factor driving changes in the structure of manufacturing". This is unsurprising given
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the accelerated integration of South Africa into the global economy. If South African
industries are to succeed, they must rationalize. However Sellars (2000 : 496) argues against
slowing down the trade liberalisation process since in the mediurn- to long-term free trade will
contribute to growth and employment creation.
6.4 SUMMARY
It appears that trade liberalisation, particularly in the current context of increasing
globalisation, has a negative effect on employment in the short term as firms are forced to
rationalise so as to become and remain internationally competitive. The development and
implementation of a labour-demanding growth strategy rests on the successful coordination of
a growth-oriented macroeconomic policy, a labour market policy that is conducive to
competition in the labour market, and a trade policy that promotes exports and encourages
greater investment in the economy.
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7 LABOUR MARKET REGULATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The dominant view is that rigidities in the labour market inhibit the efficient functioning of
the market. The basic assumption, therefore, is that anything that prevents wages and other
employee benefits from falling to market clearing levels will slow down job creation
(Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 52). This chapter considers the regulatory environment in
which the South African labour market operates and analyses the consequences this
environment has for employment.
7.2 SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR LEGISLATION
South Africa has moved from being a relatively closed and protected economy to greater
integration with international markets. In becoming more competitive, unviable jobs must be
eliminated and new jobs will be created more gradually, at least in the initial stages of trade
liberalisation. The argument that trade liberalisation and other economic reforms should be
accompanied by greater labour market flexibility is supported by international evidence
(Nattrass, 1998 cited by Barker, 1999a : 11). A more market oriented labour market, that is,
greater flexibility in the labour market, is an element of the fundamental reform process,
which has come to be known as the Washington Consensus, and forms the development
strategy suggested by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the government
of the United States of America (Calitz, 2000 : 3).
The demand for labour is a derived demand, that is, it is derived from the demand for the
product or service provided by the employer. The demand for labour is thus indirectly
affected by economic conditions, for example, expansionary or tight fiscal and monetary
policies, and domestic and foreign competitive conditions (Barker, 1999b : 77). The demand \
for labour is also directly affected by the cost of labour and the productivity of labour. The
price at which the firm's output can be sold is influenced by labour costs and the productivity
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of labour. The price charged impacts in tum the demand for the product and hence the
demand for labour.
As noted in the previous chapter, South African trade flows are characterised by capital-
intensive exports and labour-intensive imports. Given South Africa's abundance of labour
(as evidenced by the high rate of unemployment) and trade liberalisation, which has involved
the removal of industrial incentives that created a bias towards capital-intensive sectors, one
would expect a shift towards labour-intensive specialisation (lLO, 1999 : paragraph 68). This
has not occurred; instead, the economy continues to follow a path of capital-intensive
specialisation. The popular explanation for this pattern, confirmed by research' , is that South
Africa's unit labour costs are not competitive.
Where labour market institutions and policies raise the costs of labour, whether direct or
indirect, employment will be discouraged and where possible employers will switch to the use
of capital-intensive technology. This means that appropriate labour policies have a crucial
role to play in determining a country's ability to adjust to and face international competition.
Furthermore , globalisation is having a significant impact on domestic economies. Capital has
become more mobile, and the cost of labour increasingly more important as a factor
influencing a country 's competitive standing in the international market.
Labour market rigidities have their sources in the laws and regulations, the institutions
created by these laws and regulations, and union intransigence. Siebert (1997 : 43) identifies
three ways that institutional arrangements can affect the clearing function of the labour
market :
"by weakening the demand for labour, making it less attractive to hire a worker by
explicitly pushing up the wage costs or by introducing a negative shadow price for
labor; by distorting the labor supply; and by impairing the equilibrating function of the
market mechanism (for instance, by influencing bargaining behavior)".
In 1995 the Department of Labour decided to restructure the South African labour market by
introducing a series of legislative reforms which were aimed at improving labour relations,
I A SRI International study ( 1998) found that ofall the countries taken into account, South Africa had the highest
producti vity adjusted cost oflabour. Nattrass (1998) found that in a sample ofeighteen developed and
developing countr ies, only the United Kingdom had a higher wage to productivity ratio than South Africa. The
World Economic Forum in their Global Competitiveness Report place South Africa in 46th position out of 58
countri es on the basis of wage adjusted productivity levels. (All cited in Sellars , 2000 : 497)
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securmg worker rights, balancing the requirements for flexibility with the need for
employment security and redressing inequality and discrimination (ILO, 1999 : paragraph
112).
The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) was formed to
facilitate co-operation and seek consensus between organised business, organised labour, the
development constituency and government on economic, labour and development issues
(Barker, 1999b : 275) The following legislative reforms resulted from the tripartite
negotiation process:
1) The Labour Relations Act of 1995
2) The Basic Conditions ofEmployment Act of 1997
3) The Employment Equity Act of 1998
4) The Skills Development Act of 1998
These pieces of labour legislation have had and are having a negative effect on the cost of
labour (direct and indirect) and on workplace flexibility (Barker, 1999a : 13).
7.2.1 THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) formalizes and codifies umon organisational rights;
establishes a basis for economic democracy at the workplace; grants workers the right to
strike (without fear of dismissal); introduces speedy dispute resolution; and extends the law to
all workers (Baskin and Satgar, 1995 : 46). The LRA has improved job security; most
employees, including agricultural, domestic and public sector employees, are now covered by
a single set of laws. The new LRA is substantially more union friendly than its predecessor
and it recognises trade unions as an integral part of economic decision making (Baskin and
Satgar, 1995 : 47).
Job security rules do however make employers reluctant to hire new workers on indefinite
period contracts . A survey of firms employing 50 or more workers in eight manufacturing
industries in the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan area conducted in 1999 found that the
average time taken to retrench an entry level worker is 2.7 months, costing R2 160 - 2 900 for
a worker in the least skilled occupational category (Stryker, Cassim, Rajaratnam, Bhorat,
Leibrandt, Plunkett , 2001 : 67). The result is an increasing tendency to substitute capital for
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labour or make use of atypical employment (subcontractors, casual and temporary workers) or
to only engage workers on fixed-term contracts (Barker, 1999b : 38). It is very likely that
unemployment would increase.
On the other hand, increased job security could lead to employers being more selective in
their recruitment, thereby ensuring better job matching. Employers may also be encouraged
to invest more in training workers . Workers may also become less resistant to change as the
fear of losing their jobs is reduced. Although little evidence to prove either the negative or
positive effect of high job security exists, many countries have in fact relaxed or are in the
process of relaxingjob security regulations (Barker, 1999b : 38).
7.2.1.1 TRADE UNIONS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE
LABOUR RELATIONS ACT
W. H. Hutt considered labour unions in their current form as impediments to improving the
welfare and prosperity of workers in general (Baird, 1998 : 197). Instead he advocated trade
unions that are compatible with the principles of classical liberalism. Hutt's labour economics
influenced Britain's labour law reforms conducted during the 1980s under Margaret
Thatcher 's government, and New Zealand's 1991 Employment Contracts Act (Baird, 1998 :
197) According to Hutt, labour relations institutions should be founded on (i) voluntarism for
all parties, (ii) equality before the law for all parties and (iii) universal human rights (Baird,
1998 : 198).
Voluntarism requires that individuals have the right to choose, that is, workers can decide
whether to join a union, be represented by a union or become a union fees payer; and
employers can elect whether they wish to bargain with unions and then select the issues that
will be bargained over (Baird, 1998 : 198). Equality before the law requires that all parties
be governed by the same rules, and that no party to the labour process be granted special
advantage or placed under special obligation (Baird, 1998 : 198). To be a universal human
right, the right must be, according to classical liberal thought, non-rivalrous. This means that
one person's exercising the right has no effect on the ability of another individual to do the
same. Following this reasoning, no individual has a right to a job since guaranteeing an
individual a job requires that another individual provide this employment regardless of his/her
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own preferences (Baird, 1998 : 199). The only logically admissible human right with respect
to employment is the offer to buy or sell labour on one' s own terms. Everyone is then free to
accept attractive offers and turn down unattractive ones. Hutt argued that unions demand and
governments often concede many illegitimatejob-related rights (Baird, 1998 : 199).
The Labour Relations Act (1995) is not consistent with Hurt' s labour unionism. Individual
workers cannot elect the representatives they consider appropriate, workers' rights to full
freedom of association are violated, and collective bargaining is more than encouraged (Baird,
1998 : 200). Under the LRA, workers are required to accept representation by any union that
has a majority of the employer's workers as members. Furthermore, unions that do not have
the majority of workers as members may, under certain conditions, achieve monopoly
representation of an employer' s employees provided they are "sufficiently representative"
(Baird, 1998 : 201).
The LRA impinges upon an individual's right to freedom of association. In terms of the LRA,
a majority union and an employer can agree to establish a closed shop. A closed shop
agreement must have the vote of two-thirds of the workers and requires that all workers
become union members (Baird, 1998 : 201). An alternative option is the formation of an
agency shop. Under an agency shop agreement, workers need not join the majority union, but
the payment of union dues and fees is made compulsory. Workers cannot vote on agency
shops (Baird, 1998 : 202). Unions put forward the free-rider argument as justification for
forcing workers to join unions or pay union dues and fees. The law provides the opportunity
for workers other than the union's own voluntary members to benefit from representation.
Unions argue that all workers who receive representation services must therefore pay an
appropriate share of the union's costs of supplying these services, or workers would have the
incentive to become free riders, and the union' s bargaining power would be undermined
(Baird, 1998 : 202). However, it is argued that unions themselves are responsible for the
free-rider problem since they fought for legislation giving them bargaining rights (privileges)
over dissenting workers. The free-rider problem would not exist had unions confined
representation to their voluntary members (Baird, 1998 : 202).
The LRA makes collective bargaining mandatory on employers. An employer must meet
with a majority or a representational union within thirty days of the union's demand for
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organisational or recognition privileges, and a "collective agreement" must be attained (Baird,
1998 : 203).
Collective bargaining refers to the joint regulation of the employment relationship by
employer and employee representatives (Brown, 1987 : 478). By participating in the
collective bargaining process, the employer recognises the right of employees' independent
representatives, behaving as a collective, to argue their view on issues affecting their interests
(Brown, 1987 : 478). Wage and working conditions usually form the central issues of the
collective bargaining process. The effect that collective bargaining has on the employer, and
its success on the part of trade union members, is dependent on the collective strength
possessed by the employees. This bargaining power is dependent on the country's legislative
framework since this sets out the limits of rights to strike, the employment contract status, the
extent to which trade unions enjoy protection, and the legally responsible agents on each side
(Brown, 1987 : 481).
Although Brown (1987 : 479) holds that collective bargaining is best viewed as a political
institution - the interests of employers and employees each capable of harming the other, are
temporarily reconciled through collective bargaining - he acknowledges that the relative
bargaining power of each party is largely influenced by their respective labour and product
markets. The bargaining result will also affect the wages and productivity of labour. The role
played by trade unions is thus best summed up " .. . as one of constant opposition, acting to
modify management actions in the light of members' interests insofar as their organised
power permits" (Brown, 1987 : 481).
Most industrialised countries regard a commitment to collective bargaining as an essential
part of democracy, and Convention 84 (1947) of the International Labour Organisation (ILO)
states that "all practical measures shall be taken to assure to trade unions which are
representative of the workers concerned the right to conclude collective agreements with
employers and employers' associations" (Brown, 1987 : 481).
93
Employment conditions can be regulated on four different levels, namely:
1) individual employment contracts;
2) collective bargaining within the firm;
3) collective bargaining within a bargaining council; or
4) legislative or regulatory fiat (Barker , 1999a : 17).
While the Labour Relations Act (LRA) explicitly encourages collective bargaining, the new
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) favours collective bargaining at levels (3) and
(4), that is collective bargaining within a bargaining council, and legislative or regulatory fiat.
Very little provision is made in the BCEA for altering conditions of employment through
collective bargaining within a firm or through agreement between an employer and employee
(Barker, 1999a : 17). This goes against the trend that in the presence of globalisation
collective bargaining should be decentralised - collective bargaining at the enterprise level is
considered an increase in labour market flexibility. The main argument supporting this trend
is that "the increased competition enhances the interest of employers to take measures
concerning their internal labour market without being bound by rules and standards imposed
on them from higher levels" (ILO, 1999 : paragraph 126).
In South Africa, collective bargaining at the industry-, sector- and even economy-wide-levels
is encouraged through the provisions made in the legislation for the establishment of
bargaining councils and statutory councils.
A bargaining council is made up of one or more trade unions representing employees in one
or more sectors and an organisation representing the relevant employers. The union or unions
together must have as members, the majority of workers in the sector or sectors to be party to
the bargaining council. The union or unions together form one bargaining agent, and bargain
with the employers' organisation over the wages and conditions of employment for the whole
sector or the sectors covered (Baird, 1998 : 205). Bargaining council agreements have the
same force and effect as parliamentary legislation. The Minister of Labour is required by law
to extend the bargaining council agreement to all employers falling under the scope of the
bargaining council (Barker, 1999a : 14). However, the Minister must be requested to extend
the bargaining council agreement by the trade union representing the majority of employees in
the particular sector and the employers' organisation employing the majority of employees in
that sector (Barker , 1999a : 14). An amendment requiring that councils allow non-parties to
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make representations to the councils concerning collective agreements that the Minister has
been asked to extend to non-parties has been proposed. The proposed amendment will give
smaller businesses better opportunities for lobbying for the exclusion from industry
agreements (Financial Mail, 2000 : 39). Anecdotal evidence suggests that smaller businesses
only apply for an exemption when a complaint is lodged with the bargaining council,
preferring non-compliance and the evasion of registration instead (lLO, 1999 : paragraph
127).
The extension of bargaining council agreements results in wages and conditions of
employment that are standardised throughout all branches of the industry. This prevents the
employer parties (usually the larger and more profitable firms) from being under-cut by non-
party employers. Furthermore, the agreed wage rate is likely to be lower than that which the
larger, more profitable firms (which are normally members of the council) might have had to
face under a decentralised system (Barker, 1999a : 15). On the other hand, the smaller, less
profitable and more labour-intensive firms, which are usually not bargaining council
members, may find the agreed wage rate higher than that which they would otherwise have to
pay. This could undermine the viability of businesses, forcing them at best to downsize their
labour forces or at worst to shutdown entirely.
If all employers face an increase in labour costs , the likelihood of the increase being passed on
to the consumers is much higher. Competition on the basis of wages is eliminated, and the
incentive to member employers to fight wage demands is reduced. The bilateral monopoly
resulting from the bargaining council is considered by some economists as being anti-
competitive and anti-consumer; employer and unions tacitly collude to control the labour and
product markets (Barker, 1999a : 15). The resultant wage and price increases will negatively
impact the consumer, the non-party employer and the unemployed worker (Barker, 1999: 15).
However South Africa's integration into the global economy has meant that a number of
industries covered by bargaining councils now face greater competitive forces. Employers are
thus under pressure to cut costs and increase productivity . The consequences for employment
are generally negative as firms rationalise (Barker, 1999a : 16).
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Sellars (2000 : 50I) states,
" It is difficult to say anything positive about employment effects of industry level wage
setting. Certainly, the argument that industry bargaining serves only to remove labour
costs as a basis for competition is very difficult to sustain in an open economy. It is far
more likely that firms, particularly those that are small scale and labour intensive, will
bow to pressure from more efficient large-scale domestic competitors and imports, and
will close down".
It is incomprehensible that a country expenencmg high levels of unemployment largely
among the unskilled, should support an industrial relations system that is based on the
eliminationof low wage competition (Nattrass, 1998 : 85 - 86).
The suitability of the bargaining council system for South Africa has been questioned.
Highly centralised and highly decentralised bargaining systems are held to produce better
results than intermediate systems, such as bargaining councils, which contain elements of both
centralisation and decentralisation. Uncoordinated industry-level bargaining (such as occurs
in South Africa) could contribute to inflation and unemployment since the exposure of wage
bargainers at industry-level to direct competitive pressures is more remote in comparison to
that of plant-level wage bargainers, and they are less cognisant of the implications of their
wage agreements on the macro economy than would be the case of central-level bargainers
(Nattrass, 2000 : 133). However a highly centralised bargaining system involving the
successful coordination of wage agreements between employer associations and trade unions
is unlikely in South Africa at present since there is little incentive for the two groups to
negotiate at national level and it is questionable whether they even possess the capacity to
impose such an agreement on their members at industry level (Nattrass , 2000 : 133).
7.2.2 THE BASIC CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ACT
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) provides a floor of rights for all workers
on issues relating to working time, leave, termination of employment and employer
obligations. It is argued that this Act reflects the voice of insiders (i.e. the employed),
strengthening their bargaining positions and raising their real wages while largely ignoring the
plight of the unemployed (Stryker et aI, 2001 : 53).
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As already mentioned employment conditions can be regulated on four different levels,
namely:
1) individual employment contracts;
2) collective bargaining within the firm;
3) collective bargaining within a bargaining council; or
4) legislative or regulatory fiat.
While the LRA encourages collective bargaining, the new BCEA favours collective
bargaining at levels (3) and (4), that is, collective bargaining within a bargaining council, and
legislative or regulatory fiat (Sectoral determinations). Very little provision is made in the
BCEA for altering conditions of employment through collective bargaining within a firm or
through an agreement between an employer and employee (Barker, 1999a : 17).
The BCEA significantly increases the direct and indirect costs of labour. The Act reduces
hours of work from 46 to 45 hours, and further reductions (to 40 hours) are expected in the
future. This will increase the unit cost of labour and production costs in general because of
the impact on fixed and variable labour cost and capital cost. The fixed cost of labour (leave
pay, welfare services, office space, severance pay, training costs) and capital costs do not vary
in proportion with hours of work. If employees work less, the hourly fixed costs will
mcrease. The variable cost of labour depends on what happens to the hourly wage rate. If
workers are paid by the hour, a reduced workweek will not impact the hourly cost of labour.
However, most workers are paid either weekly or monthly and if the weekly/monthly rates
remain unchanged, reduced hours will increase the hourly cost of labour. Given the effect of
increased labour costs on price levels (inflation), international competition and the
substitution of capital for labour, reduced hours have been found by most researchers to
negatively affect employment creation (Barker, 1999a : 18).
Reducing hours of work and early retirement have been suggested as solutions to
unemployment. Supporters of these measures appear to assume that the output of an
economy is fixed and that there exists an exogenously given level of available work. This is
known as the lump of labour fallacy. The amount of work to be done is not fixed; rather,
evidence indicates that for a given institutional structure , the quantity of work to be done
tends to change in line with the available supply of labour, leaving equilibrium unemployment
unaltered (Nickell, 1997 : 70). Cutting hours of work or reducing the labour force will
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increase wage pressure in such a way that an equivalent cut in jobs will be required to offset it
(Nickell, 1997 : 70).
An increase in the percentage of non-wage costs means that total remuneration to an
increasing extent does not reflect workers' productivity or even demand and supply
conditions. It increases the fixed-cost component of total labour costs. Provisions in the
BCEA regarding annual leave (increased from 2 to 3 weeks), maternity leave (from 3 to 4
months), the provision of suitable alternative employment for pregnant employees, and three-
days paid family responsibility leave will all raise non-wage costs significantly. Schlemmer
and Levitz (1998 : 5) assert that the ".. .the effects on labour absorption of any legislated
upgrading of conditions of employment or further limitations on the flexibility of the use of
labour are likely to be severe".
The following amendments to the BCEA have been proposed:
• The scrapping of the premium for Sunday work
• The introduction of greater flexibility in working hours. Bargaining councils will be
able to increase the number of ordinary hours per week to above 45 hours by
collective agreement. Trade unions and employers can increase the number of
overtime hours worked per week from 10 to 15 hours by collective agreement.
The Minister will be able to vary all the conditions of employment through
Ministerial or Sectoral Determinations after taking advice from the Employment
Conditions Commission. (Labour Law Review, 2000 : 6)
• A tightening of the law on independent contractors. A senes of rebuttable
presumptions will be created to determine whether or not an employment
relationship exists. The effect of these is that where a particular factor exists, the
worker is presumed to be an employee unless the contrary is proved (Labour Law
Review, 2000 : 7). Employers will thus be required to prove that independent
contractors are truly independent. The decision is made by considering whether
there is supervision of the contractor, controlled working hours and whether the
person forms part of the organization or is economically dependent on the employer
(Financial Mail, 2000: 39).
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7.2.2.1 WAGE FLEXIBILITY
Wage flexibility means that wages should be responsive to market and economic conditions in
the country, the economic sector or in the individual enterprise. Wage adjustment is one of
the primary mechanisms through which individuals and jobs are matched.
The wage-setting process IS affected by labour market pressures , social perceptions,
legislation and the industrial relations system (OECD, 1994 : 22). The levels of collective
bargaining and the extent to which provision is made at such levels for flexibility
arrangements will directly influence wage flexibility. The South African industrial relations
system has been identified as one of the factors preventing wage rates falling to market
clearing levels, at least in the highly unionised larger corporate sectors (Schlemner and Levitz,
1998 : 58). Furthermore, the promotion of industry-level bargaining in South Africa
contradicts the global trend of decentralisation in wage determination (Standing et al, 1996;
Baskin,1998a; Hayter,1998 cited in Sellars, 2000 : 500).
Given the inadequate social security system, Nattrass (1998 : 87) argues that there is a moral
responsibility to assist the unemployed either by slowing the pace of trade liberalization (this
suggestion is heavily criticized, see Sellars, 2000; Coetzee, Gwarada, Naude, and Swanepoel,
1997), or by introducing greater flexibility into the wage determination process through, for
example, decentralising wage determination to the enterprise level, thereby granting workers
the choice of working for a low wage or becoming unemployed.
Minimum wages appear to be a major cause of unemployment among the groups they attempt
to protect, namely the young and the unskilled. In South Africa, minimum wages set by the
previous Wage Board were conservative and would have had little, if any, effect on labour
market flexibility (Barker, 1999b : 36). In the new BCEA minimum wages can be determined
by bargaining councils or sectoral determinations, either way, both institutions "act to narrow
the wage distribution by protecting unskilled wages" (Nattrass , 1998 : 87).
In sectors where proper collective bargaining does not occur, the Employment Conditions
Commission, which has replaced the Wage Board, may be requested by the Minister to
investigate the industry and then make recommendations in terms of wages and other
conditions of employment. Although the making of sectoral determinations for a particular
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sector and area could introduce a degree of flexibility, they are more likely to bring about
more demanding or additional provisions than greater flexibility (Barker, 1999b : 34). The
new BCEA allows the Minister more discretion in relation to the powers of the Employment
Conditions Commission than was the case of the Wage Board - the Minister has the authority
to change the Commission's recommendation whereas under the previous Act he could only
accept or reject a recommendation of the Wage Board (Barker, 1999b : 34). The scope of
sectoral determination is also much wider than wage determinations under the previous Act.
This may introduce greater rigidity in the labour market and thereby reduce employment
creation among lower-skilled and younger workers particularly given that South African
wages are relatively high in international terms.
Wages tend to be rigid downwards and flexible upward, in other words they are responsive to
price increases and unresponsive to unemployment. Figure 7.1 shows that wage increases or
the level of settlement (LOS) in South Africa tend to be fairly consistently above the level of
inflation as given by the consumer price index (CPI) - this is contrary to normal expectations
of supply and demand in an economy where jobs are being lost. Wage employment
elasticities in South Africa have been found to be relatively high, ranging between -0,5 and -
1,5, which suggests that a 10% increase in real wages will result in a drop in employment of
between 5% and 15% (Standing et al,1996; Baskin,1998a; Fields, Leibrandt and
Wakeford,1999 all cited in Sellars, 2000: 501).
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Figure 7.1 Average Level Of Settlement In Relation To The
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7.2.3 THE EMPLOYMENT EQUITY ACT
The purpose of the Employment Equity Act (EEA) is to achieve equity in the workplace
primarily through the prohibition of discrimination, which applies to all employers regardless
of size; and the implementation of affirmative action measures, which apply only to
"designated employers" , that is, an employer with 50 or more workers or an annual turnover
equal to or higher than the applicable minimum turnover as defined in the Act (Barker, 1999a
: 20).
In terms of the EEA employers are required to reduce disproportionate income differentials.
The Employment Conditions Commission will set acceptable proport ionate differentials. The
Minister of Labour may also establish guidelines for employers to follow in reducing income
differentials (Barker, 1999a : 20). Employers could decide to increase the wages for less
skilled workers but if this increase is not accompanied by an increase in productivity it would
negatively impact the enterprise's competitiveness. Furthermore such legislation could
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discourage the employment of less skilled workers thereby exacerbating our already serious
unemployment problem (Barker, 1999a : 20). On the other hand, employers could decide to
freeze the pay of executives but this brings the risk of losing executives to domestic and
foreign competitors.
The EEA will have a positive effect on the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR)
objective of redistribution but the extent of this effect is as yet unknown. The drafters of the
Act also claim that productivity will be positively affected; over the longer term the EEA will
result in better utilization of human resources (Barker, 1999a : 28). However affirmative
action policies may have a demotivating effect on white males. Barker (1999a : 28) notes
" ... this legislation sacrifices the principle of ' the best person for the job' in favour of a lesser
concept of suitably qualified, which refers simply to the ability to do the job".
The Act will be demanding in respect of managerial time. All "designated" employers are
required to draft and implement employment equity plans, carry out employment analyses;
implement affirmative action and report regularly to the Department of Labour.
Implementing and applying the new labour legislation will take a lot of managerial time as
well as increasing the real cost ofdoing business (Barker, 1999a : 22).
7.2.4 THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT ACT
Karl Wohlmuth, in a comprehensive review of employment and labour policies m South
Africa (cited in Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 61), concluded that:
"South Africa is prototypical for a country where the quality of the labour force is not in
conformity with the level of development and the importance of the capital
stock . ....Scarcity of skills leads in the upswing [in the economic cycle] to sharp wage
increases for the skilled .... . leading quickly to successive wage demands from the less
skilled".
This wage leverage of the scarce skilled workers also causes employers to compensate by
cutting-back their less-skilled staff. In addition, the emphasis that unions place on wage
inequality tends to sustain (foster) the relatively high wage expectations of unskilled workers.
102
The former Labour Minister, Tito Mboweni, (cited in Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 61) has
argued that the weak educational and training systems in South Africa introduce inherent
rigidities in the labour market. Functional adaptability (redeployment of workers in different
tasks within the same enterprise and skills upgrading) is hindered by skill shortages coupled
with inadequate organisation ofwork on management's part (ILO, 1999 : paragraph 124).
Competitiveness should be based not only on cost, but also on the effective and efficient
utilisation of productive resources. This includes the labour force - a highly skilled labour
force providing quality work and possessing the ability to adjust to changing conditions will
greatly increase the flexibility and competitiveness of an enterprise (Barker, 1999b : 37),
particularly in today's environment of globalisation. The existence of large numbers of
unemployed is an indication ofwasted and under-utilised resources.
The Skills Development Act creates a partnership between public and private sectors. It
establishes a centralised funding mechanism and industry level institutions to direct the
development of occupational skills (Sellars , 2000 : 502) . A payroll levy will be placed on all
firms but only those firms who train will qualify for a grant. The training strategy will have a
sectoral focus and will be aimed at providing generic skills.
The payroll training levy will be advantageous to the extent that it increases productivity but it
will also serve to raise the costs of production. Whether the gains form increased
productivity exceed the costs will depend on how efficiently and effectively the government
uses the revenues raised at the sectoral and national level (Financial Mail, 1999 : 16).
It is also argued that the Act is not very well targeted. It is most likely to be effective in
upgrading the skills of already skilled workers, while not being of much help to workers at the
lower end of the job ladder since it would be difficult to reach the unskilled, large numbers of
whom are unemployed, and then extremely costly and time-consuming to upgrade their skills
to the level that is in demand (Bhorat, Deiden and Hodge, 1998 cited in ILO, 1998 : paragraph
108).
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7.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE LABOUR LEGISLATION
Labour market reform was certainly overdue but unfortunately the form that the reform has
taken has not always been the most appropriate in the South African context . The Financial
Mail (1999 : 16) notes that, "(t)he result is a body of legislation that protects jobs instead of
creating them" . Given the extent of South Africa's unemployment problem this is not an
outcome that should be tolerated particularly when the government supposedly holds job
creation as a priority. The labour legislation is not conducive to the establishment of a
competitive labour market considered a necessary part of any labour-demanding growth
strategy.
The new legislation does not have the same impact on the major corporate sector that it does
on small- and medium-sized enterprises. The former largely meet the employment standards
set out in the legislation and they can afford "the burden of red tape that the laws impose"
(The Economist, 2001 : 11). In addition, it is this sector that has been restructuring and
shedding labour. Of the latter group, the small-sized business (employing less than 10
workers) is exempt from the new laws but the medium-sized business is not. The effect of
the new legislation has thus been to increase the rigidity of the labour market in which
medium-sized businesses operate. Given that any increase in labour absorption is anticipated
to come from the medium-sized business sector, one would have to argue that introducing
additional rigidities in the labour market is self-defeating and perverse.
The perception that the labour market is over-regulated is held internationally as well as
locally. A survey published in The Financial Mail (2000 : 38) showed that foreign investors
identify the following as labour market obstacles: the inflexible labour market (54 percent),
the unskilled labour force (31 percent), labour disputes (8 percent) and the brain drain (7
percent).
In 1996 Schlemmer and Levitz, in order to determine the local response to conditions in the
labour market, conducted a random sample survey of 300 businesses, primarily small- and
medium-sized, in Gauteng. Although not representative of South Africa as a whole, Gauteng
is the location of about 40 percent of economic activity and was considered adequate as a
basis for useful generalisations.
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The firms showed an increase in labour absorption - between 1991 and 1996 the sample on
average was found to have increased its labour force by 21 percent. However over this same
period, real turno ver and real salary bills increased by 65 and 59 percent respectively
(Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 45). However it was found that the opportunities for the less
skilled were decreasing rapidly.
Table 7.1 indicates the concerns of business with respect to labour problems and productivity.
The table lists the sample' s response to firstly, factors considered bad for business and
secondly, to the most powerful factor s which had damaged business prospects.
Table 7.1 Percentage Mentions Of Labour Problems According To Size Of Labour
Force
Number of employees
< 10 II -50 51-150 151-300 300+
Factors badf or business
Low productivity 4% 11% 13% 2 1% 10%
Labour demands 3 1% 34% 42% 42% 52%
Most powerful negative
f actors
Low producti vity 7% 6% 4% 8% 19%
Labour demands 18% 18% 26% 29% 19%
Source: Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 44
Figure 7.2 depicts the reasons given for decreases in employment over the period 1991 -1996.
Approximately 40 percent of the firms identified the difficulties of dealing with trade unions,
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Source: Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 47
Table 7.2 summarises firms' responses to identifying the main factors that make it difficult to
employ more labour. Once again labour factors emerged as significant influences on firms'
behaviour.
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Table 7.2 Difficulties Faced In Employing More Labour By Size OfCompany*
Number ofemployees
< 10 11-50 51-150 151-300 300+ All
Trade union activity 16% 17% 26% 20% 19% 19%
Minimum wage 21% 17% 25% 32% 48% 23%
Unqualified workforce 30% 24% 2 1% 36% 19% 26%
Labour laws 3% 6% 11 % 4% 5% 6%
Labour relations 6% 8% 12% 0% 10% 7%
Low producti vity 8% 13% 13% 16% 19% 12%
(All labour factors) (84%) (85%) (100%) ( 100%) (100%) (93%)
Economic factors 22% 34% 26% 36% 19% 29%
Crime 13% 15% 8% 4% 0% 11 %
llIegal immigrants 5% 2% 6% 5% 0% 3%
Imported goods 3% 2% 0% 0% 5% 2%
Automation 1% 2% 0% 4% 5% 2%
Other factors combined 40% 31% 32% 24% 29% 32%
No difficulties 5% 1% 2% 0% 5% 2%
* Multiple answers : percentages exceed 100.
Source: Schlemmer and Levitz, 1998 : 48
Schlemmer and Levitz (1998 : 49) concluded from the survey, "It is quite clear, therefore, that
the factors of quality of labour - its productivity and skill level, the labour relations or hassle
factor and the factors of labour cost combine to form a rather massive disincentive to
increased labour absorption".
In late 1999, the World Bank in partnership with the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan
Council conducted an enterprise survey of both SMMEs and large firms (i.e. firms employing
more than 50 workers) in the Greater Johannesburg metropolitan area. The SMMEs identified
insufficient demand, the high cost and non-availability of capital, crime and a lack of
infrastructure as the four most important constraints on business expansion (Stryker et al,
2001 : 66). In turn the large enterprises identified, in order of importance, crime and
violence, and then equally ranked, labour regulations, interest rates and exchange rates as
factors inhibiting growth (Stryker et al, 2001 : 67).
The challenge to South Africa thus involves more than simply deregulating the labour market.
Although the efforts being made to reduce unemployment are being hindered by an overly
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rigid labour market, the Minister of Labour points out that the high unemployment that South
Africa is experiencing has not been created by the new labour laws, instead its causes lie in,
inter alia, the structural nature of the economy, the process of globalisation and inherited
rigidities (Mdladlana, 2000 : 1).
The government is aware that under circumstances of accelerated international integration,
excessively protective regulations could have unintended negative effects on employment
creation and on enterprises' abilities to adapt (ILO, 1999 : paragraph 131). The government
is therefore committed to improve the application of the laws; address the unintended
consequences of the legislation; align and re-align the laws to the ever-changing nature of the
labour market; and ensure that the laws are sensitive to the imperative to create jobs and
attract investment (Mdladlana, 2000 : 5).
The New Zealand labour relations model, which recognises the importance of an unregulated
and competitive labour market, is a model from which South Africa could learn much.
7.4 THE NEW ZEALAND LABOUR RELATIONS MODEL
Baird (1998 : 206) argues that New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act (ECA) is the labour
relations model that the rest of the world should consider and adopt. Coe and Snower (1997 :
33) also identify New Zealand as perhaps the best example of fundamental reform. They
argue that European policies aimed at reducing unemployment have not been very successful
because governments did not always take the complementarities that exist among labour
market policies into account. In the presence of complementarities, incremental reforms
(comprising small changes in policy instruments) and partial reforms (affecting only a subset
of institutional rigidities) will have very little effect. Instead Coe and Snower (1997 : 2) argue
for reforms that are both "broad" (covering a wide range of complementary policies) and
"deep" (of substantial magnitude).
The introduction of flexibility into the labour market constituted an important part of the
reform process undertaken in New Zealand's economic and political environment
(Honeybone, 1997 : 493). Government policy in New Zealand throughout the 1960s and
1970s established a highly regulated and protected economy, with the country having one of
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the highest levels of effective protection amongst OECD countries (Honeybone, 1997 : 493).
By the early 1980s, the economy was no longer sustainable. Critical analysis of economic
and social policy was followed by wide-ranging structural and institutional reforms. Wage,
price, interest rate, credit and foreign exchange controls were abolished in 1984. The reforms
were based on the ''New Right" ideology (founded on neo-classical economics). The neo-
classical approach adopted by the New Zealand government " ... saw the market as being a
superior means of restoring democracy, individual liberty and the efficient distribution of
resources. It was highly intolerant of those pressure groups, such as trade unions, which argue
for constraints on the unfettered operation of the market" (Honeybone, 1997 : 494).
Historically, the New Zealand labour market was based on a collective ideology that implied a
role for the State in ensuring effective and efficient labour relations (Honeybone, 1997 : 494).
Pressure on the government to deregulate the labour market resulted in the revocation of the
Industrial Relations Act 1973 and the adoption ofthe Labour Relations Act 1987. The Labour
Relations Act 1987 aimed to reduce government intervention in the labour market by creating
a setting in which employers and workers could voluntarily and as equal partners agree on
employment contracts. However, the basic concepts of the previous legislation remained.
The New Zealand Business Roundtable (NZBR), which represented the chief executives of
most of New Zealand's large enterprises, and other pro-market groups, argued that the labour
market remained rigid and inflexible, and that more radical reform was required (Honeybone,
1997 : 495-496). In October 1990 a National Party Government replaced the Labour
Government, and further deregulation of the labour market was initiated. This introduction of
flexibility into the labour market and the move away from collectivism was formalised in the
Employment Contract s Act 1991 (Honeybone, 1997 : 496).
Free market principles form the basis of the Employment Contracts Act and it adopts the
libertarian notion that employers and workers are free agents, able to agree with each other on
the wage and conditions of employment (Honeybone, 1997 : 496). The Act was designed to
encourage individual or collective arrangements at the enterprise or sub-enterprise level.
Furthermore, whether or not bargaining for an individual or collective employment contract is
to occur , is itself negotiable (Honeybone, 1997 : 496-497). The individual employee and
employer are the primary parties to the bargaining process, but each can elect another person,
group or organisation to represent them in the bargaining process (Honeybone, 1997 : 497).
Trade unions or trade unionism are not mentioned in the Act, and unions no longer play a
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statutory role in the labour market (Honeybone, 1997 : 497). Exclusive bargaining rights or
automatic rights in the workplace have been removed, and compulsory union membership and
compulsory dues and fees payments are not allowed (Baird, 1997 : 207).
Employers and employees select the form and level of bargaining, allowing the enterprise the
flexibility to adopt labour relations consistent with its specific requirements (Honeybone,
1997 : 501). The Employment Contracts Act (1991) focused on the enterprise/firm,
effectively ending centralised bargaining. Honeybone (1997 : 498) states
"Arguably, the emergence of the enterprise as the predominant bargaining level (with
various laws on minimum conditions used as guidelines), has been the most important
development in fostering flexibility in enterprises, whether by way of collective or
individual employment contracts".
Prior to the Employment Contracts Act 1991, settlements most often occurred through
industry or occupational bargaining, coordinated at the national level. Multi-employer
negotiations were held annually and many of the settlements were extended to cover those not
directly involved in the negotiation process, thereby creating "blanket coverage" of the
industry or occupational group (Honeybone, 1997 : 500).
Where the decentralisation process has resulted in individual employment contracts, concern
has been expressed about workers ' rights and the imbalance of power in the employment
relationship (Honeybone, 1997 : 501). The tentative argument is that the Act is more likely to
negatively impact the more vulnerable worker (young, female, less skilled, or a combination
of the three) who is most in need ofa collective approach (Honeybone, 1997: 501).
The New Zealand labour market has been shaped by the perception that increased flexibility
in the enterprise is an essential given greater global competition in product and service
markets (Honeybone, 1997 : 505). The greater scope given to managerial prerogative and
unilateral managerial action has been used by managers to make labour relations as flexible as
product and service markets are thought to demand (Honeybone, 1997 : 502,505).
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7.5 SUMMARY
The South African labour market is not as competitive as one would like, given the challenge
of combating a seriously high and seemingly persistent level of unemployment. On balance
the labour legislation favours "insiders" , that is, those already in employment. Bargaining
councils playa dominant role in the wage setting process where their effect is to reduce low
wage competition. South Africa does not have the social security system to assist the
unemployed and it is therefore a duty of government to ensure that the unemployed have the
opportunity to accept low wage employment should they desire it. Protecting those in
employment to the detriment of the unemployed, who in all probability are already
experiencing severe impoverishment, suggests a disregard of an individual's right to decide
whether or not to work at a particular wage and to provide for himselflherself and family.
Fundamental reform of the labour market along the lines of that undertaken in New Zealand
would introduce more flexibility into the labour market and would contribute to lowering the
unemployment rate as firms through improved competitiveness are able to capture a greater
share ofand grow the export market for their products.
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8 CONCLUSION
Currently the broad consensus is that labour market rigidities or institutional arrangements
played a role in propagating the effects of adverse shocks on unemployment in Europe over
the past three decades. A number of studies conducted by experts in the field of labour
economics have found support for a relationship between certain labour market rigidities and
unemployment. Nickell and Layard (1999) found that the labour market institutions on which
policy should be focussed are social security systems and trade unions .
The thesis showed that since South Africa does not have a social security system to speak of
and attention could be directed to the trade unions . Trade union density in South Africa is
high by international standards and the unions have through the labour legislation been
granted a significant role in the operation of the labour market. The existence of unions
serves to raise unemployment and reduce growth rates . However these negative effects can
be counterbalanced if there is central coordination between unions and firms in the wage
bargaining process. This does not occur in South Africa where the legislation allows,
through the establishment of bargaining councils , for wage bargaining at an intermediate-
level. Little incentive exists for the coordination of wage bargaining between employer
associations and unions . Furthermore, whether these organisations possess the capacity to
impose such agreements on their members at industry level is doubtful.
The review of the legislation concluded that both the direct and the indirect costs of labour
have been raised , but perhaps the most significant outcome has been the perception by many
employers of a "hassle factor" associated with employing workers. This has resulted in less
hiring, and where possible the substitution of capital for labour or the outsourcing of non-
essential tasks. Complex legislation, the implementation of which is time-consuming and
costly, is not appropriate in South Africa.
It was found that as trade has been liberalised, firms have had to restructure in order to
achieve a competitive standing internationally. In the short run this results In more
unemployment particularly among the less skilled. This is exacerbated by the fact that South
Africa's comparative advantage appears to be in the production of less labour-intensive and
more skill-intensive goods and services. Specialisation in the production and exportation of
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labour-intensive goods and services IS precluded by South Africa 's relatively expensive
unskilled and semi-skilled labour. The demand for labour thus appears to be following the
worldwide trend with growth taking place in the higher skill levels while the demand for the
less skilled contracts.
Proposed as a possible solution is to identify the skills that are in demand and upgrade the
skills of the labour force to that level. Failure to do so will push the wages for skilled workers
up as demand exceeds supply . In turn , the emphasis placed by trade unions on reducing
income inequalities will serve to sustain the relatively high wage expectations of the unskilled
workers. The intention of the Skills Development Act is to do just this but it is argued that it
is most likely to be effective in upgrading the skills of already skilled workers, while not
being of much help to workers at the lower end of the job ladder since it would be difficult to
reach the unskilled , large numbers of whom are unemployed, and then extremely costly and
time-consuming to upgrade their skills to the level that is in demand (Bhorat et aI, cited in
ILO, 1998 : paragraph 108). More attention needs to be paid to the skills and training
provided by the country's secondary and tertiary educational institutions. This presents a
more permanent solution since at least those entering the labour force for the first time will be
equipped with the skills that are in demand in the economy.
Reversing the trade liberalisation process is not a solution and doing so would severely set
back and hinder the growth of the South African economy. Globalisation is a reality and to
survive requires change and adaptation. Greater flexibility in the labour market is one
requirement of doing so.
In light of international experience the policy which seems most appropriate is the OEeD
Jobs Strategy, which is a balanced and comprehensive set of reforms designed to improve
countries ' capacities to be innovative and to adapt to change and consequently to raise
employment. Its adoption and conscientious implementation has produced positive results for
countries. The strategy has at its centre the creation of more flexible labour markets.
However, South Africa by adopting the current legislation has gone against the international
trend and has chose to ignore an unemployment strategy that has proved successful. This
seems irresponsible in a country where conservatively 26,4 percent of the economically active
population is unemployed. Furthermore this unemployment is concentrated among those
groups of the population who are already impoverished and hence least able to afford it.
South Africa is at risk of marginalizing large numbers of its population.
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APPENDIX A NICKELL AND LAYARD DATA
Table Al Unemployment Rates In The OECD (%)
1983 - 1983 - 1988 1989 - 1994
1996
Total Total Short-term Long-term Total Short-term Long-term
Austria 3.8 3.6 Na Na 3.7 Na Na
Belgium 9.7 11.3 3.3 8.0 8.1 2.9 5.1
Denmark 9.9 9.0 6.0 3.0 10.8 7.9 3.0
Finland 9.1 5.1 4.0 1.0 10.5 8.9 1.7
France 10.4 9.8 5.4 4.4 10.4 6.5 3.9
Germany (W) 6.2 6.8 3.7 3.1 5.4 3.2 2.2
Ireland 15.1 16.1 6.9 9.2 14.8 5.4 9.4
Italy 7.6 6.9 3.1 3.8 8.2 2.9 5.3
Netherlands 8.4 10.5 5.0 5.5 7.0 3.5 3.5
Norway 4.2 2.7 2.5 0.2 5.5 4.3 1.2
Portugal 6.4 7.6 3.5 4.2 5.0 3.0 2.0
Spain 19.7 19.6 8.3 11.3 18.9 9.1 9.7
Sweden 4.3 2.6 2.3 0.3 4.4 4.0 0.4
Switzerland 1.8 0.8 0.7 0.1 2.3 1.8 0.5
U.K. 9.7 10.9 5.8 5.1 8.9 5.5 3.4
Canada 9.8 9.9 9.0 0.9 9.8 8.9 0.9
U.S. 6.5 7.1 6.4 0.7 6.2 5.6 0.6
Japan 2.6 2.7 2.2 0.5 2.3 1.9 0.4
Australia 8.7 8.4 5.9 2.4 9.0 6.2 2.7
New Zealand 6.8 4.9 4.3 0.6 8.9 6.6 2.3
Source. NIckell and Layard, 1999 : 3033
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Table A2 Characteristics OfOECD Labour Markets 1,1989 -1994
Direct Rigidities Treatment of the Unemployed
I 2 3 4 5 6
Employment Labour Benefit Benefit Duration Active Labour % households
Protection Standards Replacement (years) Market Policies who are owner-
Rate (%) occupiers
Austria 16 5 50 2 8.3 54
Belgium 17 4 60 4 14.6 65
Denmark 5 2 90 2.5 10.3 55
Finland 10 5 63 2 16.4 78
France 14 6 57 3 8.8 56
Germany(W) 15 6 63 4 25.7 42
Ireland 12 4 37 4 9.1 76
Italy 20 7 20 0.5 10.3 68
Netherlands 9 5 70 2 6.9 45
Norway II 5 65 1.5 14.7 78
Portugal 18 4 65 0.8 18.8 58
Spain 19 7 70 3.5 4.7 75
Sweden 13 7 80 1.2 59.3 56
Switzerland 6 3 70 I 8.2 28
U.K. 7 0 38 4 6.4 65
Canada 3 2 59 I 5.9 63
U.S. I 0 50 0.5 3.0 64
Japan 8 I 60 0.5 4.3 59
Australia 4 3 36 4 3.2 70
New Zealand 2 3 30 4 6.8 71
Source. NIckell and Layard, 1999 . 3040, 3045
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Table A3 Characteristics Of OEeD Labour Markets II, 1989 - 1994
7 8 9a 9b 10 I I 12
Union Union Union Employer Cent ralization Payroll Tota l Tax
Density Coverage Coordination Coordination Tax Rate (%)
(%) Index Rate (%)
Austria 46.2 3 3 3 17 22.6 53.7
Belgium 51.2 3 2 2 10 2 1.5 49.8
Denmark 7 1.4 3 3 3 14 0.6 46.3
Fin land 72.0 3 2 3 13 25.5 65.9
Franc e 9.8 3 2 2 7 38.8 63.8
Germany (W) 32.9 3 2 3 12 23.0 53.0
Ireland 49 .7 3 I I 6 7.1 34.3
Italy 38.8 3 2 2 5 40.2 62.9
Netherlands 25.5 3 2 2 I I 27.5 56.5
Norway 56.0 3 3 3 16 17.5 48.6
Portugal 3 1.8 3 2 2 7 14.5 37.6
Spain 11.0 3 2 I 7 33.2 54.2
Sweden 82.5 3 3 3 15 37.8 70.7
Switzerland 26.6 2 I 3 3 14.5 38.6
U.K. 39.1 2 I I 6 13.8 40 .8
Canada 35.8 2 1 I I 13.0 42 .7
U.S. 15.6 I I I 2 20.9 43.8
Japan 25.4 2 2 2 4 16.5 36.3
Australia 40.4 3 2 I 8 2.5 28.7
New Zealand 44 .8 2 I I 9 - 34.8
Source. NIckell and Layard, 1999 . 3038 , 3041
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APPENDIX B A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE
SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
The first trade unions in South Africa were formed by the skilled European workers who had
come to work mainly on the mines. These workers followed the European trade union
ideology of socialism and the use of industrial action . The first quarter of the twentieth century
saw a number of strikes taking place primarily in the mining industry , and although led by the
white workers, these strikes enjoyed to a certain extent the support of the black migrant
workers. In 1912 the government had introduced War Measure 145 that made strikes illegal
and imposed severe sanctions on strikes . This proved ineffective and the number of illegal
strikes increased to 60 over the subsequent two-year period (Innes , 1999 : 17).
In February 1920, 71 000 black workers (out of a total labour force of 173 000) went on strike
on 22 of the 35 mines on the Rand . This strike won few reforms but elicited concern among
the mine owners which led to the adoption of a strategy by the Chamber of Mines aimed at
allowing black workers into white miners' semi-skilled jobs. In November 1921 the Chamber
of Mines made known its intention to break the ' conventional colour bar ' that protected 19 job
categories in which 4020 whites were employed , and to rearrange underground work (Innes,
1999 : 15). This triggered the 1922 Rand Revolt - white coal miners went in strike on 2
January 1922 and on 12 January, they were joined by white gold miners . The revolt ended on
16 March but only after the government had declared martial law, 250 people had been killed
and 4 758 people arrested (Innes , 1999 : 15).
The Smuts government's response to the Rand Revolt proved its downfall. In the 1924
general elections Smuts was replaced by a Nationalist-Labour Party coalition (known as the
Pact government) . In 1924, the Pact government passed the Industrial Conciliation Act which
legalised trade unions and collective bargaining for white, coloured and Indian workers. The
Wage Act of 1925 pro vided for statutory wage determinations for non-African, non-unionised
workers, and the Job Reservation Act of 1926 secured jobs for white workers, further
extending white worker rights and leading to the establishment of a racially segmented labour
market with white workers enjoying superiority (Innes, 1999 : 16).
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South Africa's first major black trade union, the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union
(lCU) was formed in 1919. The ICU was a general union, representing a loosely organised
association of workers across industries. The union grew rapidly reaching a peak membership
of 100 000 in 1926. The Pact government was in power at this time and in 1927 they launched
a 'campaign of terror' against the ICU, the Communist Party and union federations such as the
non-racial South African Trade Union Congress (Satuc) and the black South African
Federation of Non- European Trade Unions. By 1932 the government had succeeded in
destroying the ICU and the Communist Party and the two union federations mentioned above
had been forced into submission (Innes , 1999 : 16).
The African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU) aimed at organising black mine workers, was
established in 1941 and had acquired a membership of 44 000 by 1944. In August 1946
AMWU organised the biggest strike South Africa had ever experienced up to that date. About
100 000 black mine workers went on strike demanding a minimum wage of ten shillings per
day. The government reacted quickly and forcefully, and within six days the strike was
crushed without any of their demands being met.
By 1948, the African National Congress (ANC) , which had been founded in 1912, was in the
process of being transformed by its Youth League. A more militant approach had been
adopted and on 1 May 1950 the ANC's new strategy of mass action and mass mobilisation was
launched with a one-day work stoppage called in protest against the Suppression of
Communism Bill, which sought to ban the Communist Party and to grant the government new
powers (Innes, 1999 : 17). In 1952 the ANC initiated its Defiance Campaign of civil
disobedience. In 1955 the ANC together with other allied organisations, including the South
African Congress of Trade Unions (Sactu), which had only been formed in March of that year ,
adopted the Freedom Charter at the Congress of the People held in Kliptown in the Transvaal.
However, after the ANC and PAC were banned in 1960, Sactu collapsed, the reason being that
after the formal alliance between the ANC and Sactu in 1955, most of Sactus leaders had
come from within the ANC ; thus once the ANC was banned, Sactu's leaders were either
arrested, or forced underground and exiled (Innes, 1999 : 18).
In 1973 black workers in Durban went on strike demanding better wages . The strike spread to
other parts of Natal and even the Transvaal, and led to the formation of a number of new
unions, such as the Metal and Allied Workers Union (now Numsa), the Chemical Workers
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Industrial Union (now Ceppwawu), the National Union of Textile Workers (now Sactwu), and
the Transport and General Workers Union . These unions had a combined membership of 14
000 by 1975 and in 1979 the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu) bringing
together the newly formed black unions , was launched . By 1983 Fosatu had a membership of
106 000 workers (Innes, 1999 : 19).
The growth of these new unions led to the government adopting the recommendations of the
Wiehahn Commission. In 1981 the government passed the Labour Relations Act which
effectively legalised the African union movement. Following legal recognition, the unions
entered into an expansion phase, although black unions continued to be the subject of state
repression and employer hostility (Baskin , 1996 : 22) .
Granting industrial citizenship without political citizenship was a fundamentally unstable
arrangement and resulted in the use of the black union movement as a vehicle in the anti-
apartheid struggle. The African unions gave a previously powerless people a chance to have
their voices heard . Union demands were thus of a socio-political nature as well as of the
bread-and-butter variety (Baskin, 1996 : 22) . In November 1985 Fosatu combined with the
National Union of Mineworkers (Num) , the South African Allied Workers Union (Saawu), the
General Workers ' Union (Gwu), and the General and Allied Workers Union (Gawu) inter alia,
to form the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) . Cosatu adopted non-racialism,
held both capitalism and apartheid in contempt and called for the revolutionary overthrow of
the apartheid state (Baskin , 1996 : 22) . These new more militant unions quickly displaced the
more conservative unions and within months of Cosatu 's launch the conservative union Trade
Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) had collapsed . Cosatu supported the ANC thus
giving the ANC a considerable power base among the black working class . Cosatu adopted
the Freedom Charter and formed an alliance with the ANC and the South African Communist
Party. To avoid the mistake made by Sactu , Cosatu ensured that the union movement retained
some autonomy and kept its leadership separate from that of the ANC (Innes, 1999 : 20). By
1991 Cosatu had a claimed membership of 1.2 million growing to approximately 1.8 million by
1999.
After the ANC was elected to power in April 1994, they enacted legislation (the Labour
Relations Act 1995) that strengthened the position of employees and their unions within the
new South Africa . The ANC and Cosatu also decided to allow Cosatu ' s leaders and the
11 9
leaders of its affiliates to join the ANC as part of the three tiers of government (national,
regional and local) . Unions experienced a substantial ' brain drain' as many of their most
qualified and experienced leaders left to enter electoral politics, business or the civil service.
During 1994, Cosatu and its affiliates lost an estimated 80 experienced unionists out of a staff
of 1 450 . Replacements tended to be much younger and less experienced. Furthermore as
racial barriers fell and pressures to implement affirmative action grew, many talented shop-
stewards were promoted to supervisory and management positions, weakening union
representation at enterprise level (Baskin , 1996 : 34). Salary levels, job satisfaction, career
prospects, uncertainty about the future and a desire to ' move on ' are identified as reasons for
the high level of staff turnover among unions (Baskin, 1996 : 35) .
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